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Short abstract:
Nowadays, more than ever, digital forensics activities are involved in
any criminal, civil or military investigation and represent a fundamental
tool to support cyber-security. Investigators use a variety of techniques
and proprietary software forensic applications to examine the copy of
digital devices, searching hidden, deleted, encrypted, or damaged files
or folders. Any evidence found is carefully analysed and documented
in a "finding report" in preparation for legal proceedings that involve
discovery, depositions, or actual litigation. The aim is to discover
and analyse patterns of fraudulent activities. In this work, a new
methodology is proposed to support investigators during the analysis
process, correlating evidences found through different forensic tools. The
methodology was implemented through a system able to add semantic
assertion to data generated by forensics tools during extraction processes.
These assertions enable more effective access to relevant information
and enhanced retrieval and reasoning capabilities.
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4 1. Background and Motivation
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, seeing any news program, listening to a radio news
report, reading a (online) newspaper, we can see how much the number
of investigations and trials that have seen the use of digital evidences is
growing.
People doing activities in the digital world leave pieces or echoes of
themselves, just like they leave traces of themselves – fingerprints, hairs,
DNA, etc. – when they move and interact with other people, places,
and objects, in the real world. So, activities conducted on individual
computer systems and networks routinely leave some kind of digital
fingerprint. These may range from web browser history caches and
cookies, through to deleted file fragments, email headers, document
metadata, process logs, and backup files.
As Information Technology (IT) systems are involved in almost all daily
activities (related to business and industrial purposes, safety systems,
education or entertainment, etc.1), these virtual or digital traces may
be deemed to be of value, for any number of reasons. They may be
useful as evidence in establishing the origins of a document or piece of
software, for legal purposes in determining the activities of the parties
involved in a criminal case, or even as a resource for cyber-criminals
looking to reconstruct information or identifying credentials on their
victims. Whatever the motivation, the examination, interpretation, or
reconstruction of trace evidence in the computing environment falls
within the realm of Computer Forensics.
Cybercrime is the term used by the Anglo-Saxons to indicate crimes
involving computer systems; more precisely, it is possible to identify two
categories related to cybercrime:
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1. crimes for which IT or telematic systemsi are the object of the
offenceii;
2. crimes for which information or telecommunications systems are
the tools of criminal action; more precisely, the technological tool
is used to "deceive" the useriii or to "facilitate" the commission of
an offenceiv.
In the last twenty years there has been a real explosion of computer
crimes,2 although the matter is still difficult for many legal operators.
IT crimes are difficult to reconstruct because it is not clear how many
authors are and where they act, often they are difficult to trace and,
even when this happens, it can be difficult to understand how many
times an action has been committed and what are the victims.3
More generally, computer evidences now come into play in almost all
processes (both criminal and civil) due to the fact that an information
system is, trivially, a mere container of digital data (and therefore of
potential evidences in digital format): in all cases of homicide the phone
records are used for the geo-localization of people, in all cases of robbery
CCTV camera records are used, and so on.
A research conducted by IISFAv in 2012 has shown that more than
iThe term "computer or electronic system" is used to indicate in general any kind of
computer tool (computers, mobile phones, storage devices, washing machines ...).
In the Budapest Convention, art. 1 computer system is defined as "any equipment
or group of interconnected or connected devices, one or more of which, on the
basis of a program, perform the automatic processing of data".
iiAn example of a crime for which the offence is a computer or electronic system is
the infection with viruses or worms
iiiAn example is the phishing, a phenomenon of social engineering that, through
the sending of unknown scammers by fraudulent emails, encourages victims to
voluntarily provide personal information, such as credit card data.
ivAn example is the case of the copying of confidential data protected by intellectual
property from the company servers to carry out unfair competition practices
vThe IISFA (International Information System Forensics Association) is an asso-
ciation of professionals in the field of computer forensics (lawyers, law enforce-
ment agencies and technicians) internationally recognized (http://www.iisfa.org/),
whose primary purpose is the promotion of the study, the formulation of methods
and standards concerning the Computer Forensics activities. In this regard, the
Italian section of the association (http://www.iisfa.net/) is particularly active,
organizing numerous refresher courses and seminars for both lawyers and techni-
cians: among them the annual ISISFA event stands out. Forum, during which the
latest results of studies on the topic are presented.
6 1. Background and Motivation
half of the computer crimes pertain to abusive access to an information
system, corporate infidelity (which often results in abusive access to
an IT system in order to steal industrial secrets) and offences of child
pornography committed through the use of file sharing clients on a
peer-to-peer network.4
The youngest of forensic sciences, Computer Forensics, comes into play,
which deals with the preservation, identification, extraction and doc-
umentation of the digital evidences. Like any other forensics science,
Computer Forensics is about the use of sophisticated technological tools
and procedures that must be followed to ensure the preservation of
the computer evidence and the accuracy of the results regarding its
elaboration.5 Generally speaking, it is a question of identifying the
better ways to acquire the evidences without altering or modifying the
computer system on which they are located and ensuring that the evi-
dences acquired on another medium is identical to the original ones.6
Unlike Computer Security, that deals with the protection of an IT sys-
tem, Computer Forensics informs after the violation has occurred or,
in general, that the system has been actively or passively involved in
a crime; the aim is the examination and documentation of the data
contained within the informatics findings to reconstruct the events that
have occurred: a detailed analysis allows to know the activities, tastes,
thoughts of the user in order to conduct the investigations in the right
direction and acquire evidences related to the life of its user.
After analysing in detail the methodological and applicative aspects of
forensics, this work will focus on the definition of a specific methodology
for forensic analysis of information systems. Moreover, an application of
semantic techniques to enrich the analysis and correlation process of a
forensics investigation is presented. The addition of semantic assertion
to data generated during various analysis phases, should improve the
presentation results, enabling more accurate correlation of traces and
more powerful searches.
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1.2 Computer Forensics
Computer Forensics is a branch of forensic sciences, ie those of medical,
biological, electrical, mechanical, electronic, computer science, etc. that
can provide "objective" techno-scientific evidences as elements of judge-
ment both in the case of civil and criminal proceedings. It comprehends
the practices of collecting, analysing and reporting relevant information,
called digital evidences, found on computers and networks, in such a way
that this process is deemed admissible in a legal context – whether that
be as evidence in a criminal or civil investigation, or as documentary
proof in a commercial or private setting.
Since computers, mobile phones, and the internet represent the largest
growing resource for criminals, Computer Forensics has assumed a key
role in the law enforcement sector. With cyber-crimes offering a high-
yield and relatively low risk opportunity that doesn’t require physical
violence, law enforcement agencies are now continually engaged in digital
forensic activities to curb the exploits of fraudsters, identity thieves,
ransomware distributors, and others in the cyber-criminal ecosystem.
Therefore, the aim of the forensic sciences is to analyse facts inherent in
digital systems that result in violations of civil, criminal and/or internal
regulations and to produce scientific evidences. These evidences can
be introduced into a judicial process in the form of means of proof, on
which the judge will base his conviction and therefore his decision. As
this definition suggests, digital forensic operations may be applied in
commercial, private, or institutional applications, and in the context of
cyber-security.
The analysis must lead to obtaining digital evidence sources, ie data that
can testify, as absolutely as possible, the facts related to the violation to
be ascertained, highlighting the times, the events, the systems used, the
lines and the means of communication, as well as identifying elements
such as user names, IP, MAC address, password, biometric codes, etc.
The evidence sources acquired in this way will be used as support
for decisions through their admission and discussion in court. The
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essential characteristics of conducting a Computer Forensics analysis are
essentially three:
1. use of scientifically accepted procedures;
2. determinism and correct timing of the activities carried out;
3. repeatability of technical assessments.
Computer Forensics must satisfy both technical/methodological and
legal/juridical needs. The use of scientifically accepted procedures is of
paramount importance during the analysis; in fact, following procedures
that are not scientifically contested (and difficult to contest) will facilitate
the use of the means of proof in court, protecting the evidence, and
the results of the analysis, from possible disputes. At present, there
are no codified procedures for conducting a forensic analysis, whereby
each operator and each police force and/or private entity have developed
internal protocols to be followed, which are constantly evolving and
improving.
1.2.1 Definition
The first complete definition in Italian literature was made by Maioli6
that qualifies the Digital Forensic science as "the discipline that studies
the set of activities that are aimed at analysing and solving cases related
to cyber-crime, including the crimes realized with the use of a computer,
directed to a computer or in which the computer can still represent a
source of proof ".
The purposes of Computer Forensics are the preservation, identification,
acquisition, documentation and interpretation of data on a computer.
Generally speaking, it cares about identifying the best ways to:
• acquire the tests without altering or modifying the computer
system on which they are located;
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• ensure that the evidence acquired on another medium is identical
to the original ones,
• analyse data without altering them.7
The forensic computer science includes the verification activities of the
data storage media and of the computer components, of the images,
audio and video generated by computers, of the contents of archives and
databases and of the actions carried out in the telematic networks.
In reality, this definition, albeit very detailed, would seem to relegate
forensics to the criminal field only, while it is now common to use
Computer Forensics techniques also in the civil process, in the field of
labor law, in administrative law or in internal corporate investigations.
Another definition elaborated in doctrine that has been widely dissem-
inated sees forensic as "the science that disciplines the methods for
the preservation, identification and study of information contained in
computers or information systems in general, in order to to highlight the
existence of useful evidence to carry out the investigative activity"8 and
that "studies the value that a data related to an information or telematic
system can have in the juridical field".9
During the years, several American Computer Forensics researchers,
proposed different definitions of the topic of study of the "Computer
Forensics", which converged substantially on some aspects constituting
the common denominator: the treatment of digital data for forensic use,
and therefore investigative and judicial, had to be carried out according
to scientific principles, certain technical methodologies and in accordance
with the procedural rules.
For Caloyannides, the Computer forensic "... is the collection of tech-
niques and tools used to search for a means of proof in a computer".10
For Vacca, "Computer forensics involves the preservation, identification,
extraction and documentation of computer evidence stored as data or
magnetically encoded information (...) Computer forensics also referred
to as computer forensic analysis, electronic discovery, electronic evidence
discovery, digital discovery, data recovery, data discovery, computer anal-
ysis, and computer examination, is the process of methodically examining
computer media (hard disk, diskettes, tapes, etc.) for evidence".11
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For Kruse II and Heiser, "Computer forensics (. . . ) involves the preser-
vation, identification, extraction, documentation and interpretation of
computer data".7
For Marcella and Greenfield, "Computer Forensics (. . . ) deals with the
preservation, identification, extraction, and documentation of computer
evidence. (. . . ) Like any other forensics science, computer forensics
involves the use of sophisticated technology tools and procedures that must
be followed to guarantee the accuracy of the preservation of evidence and
the accuracy of results concerning computer evidence processing".5
Finally, Casey focused the study of "digital evidence", defined as "Any
data filed or transmitted through a computer to support or deny a theory
about how a crime was committed or which directs crucial elements of the
crime as the end or the alibi",12 overcoming the category of Computer
Forensics.
1.2.2 History
The birth and development of Computer Forensics as an independent
branch is closely related to the evolution of the information society
(Information and Communication Technology, ICT). Until the late 1990s,
what became known as Computer Forensics was commonly termed
"Computer Forensics". Computer Forensics was born in the United States
of America as the discipline that deals with the study of information
technology for judicial purposes, and since the 70s has known a significant
theoretical and practical development. In those years, the American
social and productive landscape had radical changes as a result of
the growing and widespread diffusion of information technologies in
the most disparate social contexts: from the communicative, to the
productive, to the personal. At the same time, the diffusion of computer
technology also determined an increase in criminal activities in which
the IT devices, at the time mostly computer sometimes connected to
the network, constituted the object of a crime (computer crimes), or an
instrument for the commission of a crime (so-called computer related
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crimes), or, more frequently, an instrument storing relevant data relating
to the facts under investigation (computer evidence).
Computer Forensics assumed a great relevance in the American inves-
tigative panorama, even more after the proposal of a standard in the
"Proposed Standards for the Exchange of Digital Evidence", made by
the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWEDGE) and by
Organization on Digital Evidence (IOCE), published in 1998. Thereafter,
the FBI introduced a list of techniques for processing digital devices
for justice purposes, as part of the "Handbook of Forensic Services",
published in 1999 on her own website. In the section of the Manual
concerning the insurance and the examination of the means of proof,
in addition to the traditional investigation techniques, a new series of
services and techniques for the treatment and examination of IT find-
ings, formalized as "Computer Forensics" services, was listed, organized
according to standardized methods and tools.
Related to the new requirements, the FBI made available to authorities
and agencies, new specific competences for the treatment of digital
devices, such as data seizure, data duplication, data preservation, data
recovery, document searches, media conversion and expert witness ser-
vices. In particular, in the "Manual of Forensic Services" an articulated
series of services relating to data and digital devices was exposed: from
the "Computer Analysis", for which technicians could perform opera-
tions of analysis of the device in relation to the content ("the exams
can determine what types of data are contained in a computer"), to the
comparison of data ("the exams can compare files to know the contents of
documents"), to the reconstruction of data creation timeline ("the exams
can determine the time and sequence with which the files were created"),
to the extraction and recovery of files deleted from the computer ("files
can be extracted from the computer"), to the file format conversion (
"files can be converted from one format to another"), to keyword searches
("files can be searched by word or phrase and the results can be stored").
In 2001, a research on computer crimes stated the need to spread the
awareness among the local state law enforcement agencies of the problems
and practices of Computer Forensics. So, the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ), the Research and Development agency of the US Department
12 1. Background and Motivation
of Justice, published a guide for the inspection activities. In 2002,
the Department of Justice published the second version of the Manual
"Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence
in Criminal Investigations"vi, updated to the provisions of the Patriot
Act approved after the events of 11 September 2001, while the IOCE
presented to the G8 a first set of principles on procedures related to
digital means of proof.
In the same time, Computer Forensics principles have been widely applied
in large corporate sectors (industries, banking, insurance, healthcare,
ICT), professionals (lawyers, private investigators and consultants) and
in non-governmental organizations, within which studies were performed
for the enhancement of collection and storage of digital evidence during
an event of a security breach.
1.2.3 Topics, goals and challenges
The wide diffusion of computer technology has favoured the development
of a whole specific branch of the investigative sciences, concerning the
study of the computer as an archive of information useful for the recon-
struction of the facts of the relevant process. A growing demand for the
analysis of digitized data for investigative purposes has been derived,
thus determining the development of the Computer Forensics techniques,
characterized both by the need to proceed by adopting techniques and
tools that allow compliance with the principles recognized by the Ameri-
can process system, as well as the application of information technology
to the investigation activities. In particular, the origin of Computer
Forensics derives from the investigative practice developed on computer
devices, properly considered as crime tools, but also formidable archives
of useful information for the ex post reconstruction of a crime scene.
The attention to computer systems analysis has been facilitated by the
viSearching and Seizing Computers ad Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal In-
vestigations, 2002, http://www.finer-bering.com/GULAW_PDFs/s&smanual2002.
pdf.
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typical culture and tradition of US investigative reality, historically ori-
ented to the application of scientific principles, tools and methodologies
to the activity of acquisition of information useful for the reconstruction
of the facts relevant to judicial purposes.
In this regard, the fundamental principles of the American (criminal)
process, such as the legal and procedural fairness, the timely notice of
the charges, the guiltness to be proven by legally obtained evidence, and
the verdict must be supported by the evidence legally presented, must be
recalled. From these principles derive some corollaries.
First of all, the investigator must observe with rigour scientific and
methodological methods during the acquisition of the means of proof to
be presented for trial, to avoid that the trial counterpart undermines
their reliability and probative value.
Secondly, the part proceeding (Plaintiff) has the responsibility to exhibit
means of proof against the Defendant and, therefore, to effectively prove
the assumptions in support of his own procedural position, or to prove
that the counterpart’s assertions are wrong, thereby undermining the
representative effectiveness of the adversarial means of proof.
Thirdly, it is the duty of the defendant to exhibit the evidence for his own
discharge and then to effectively prove the assumptions in support of his
own procedural position, or by highlighting the erroneous assumptions
of the counterpart undermining the representative effectiveness of the
opposing means of proof.
After the development of networks, Internet and telecommunications
technologies, this approach has also been extended to data transmission
systems. This has led to the development of new techniques and tools of
data capturing for legal purposes, according to the procedures established
by the procedural rules and other fundamental rights such as, for example,
the freedom and secrecy of electronic correspondence, telematic and
telephone communications, as well as confidentiality in general.
This new area is called Network forensics and studies the rules, methods
and tools for investigative and judicial manipulation of data transmitted
on digital networks.
The affirmation of Computer Forensics over the years has been progres-
sive and constant, investing all the devices produced by the technological
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evolution, and articulating itself in other branches such as Mobile foren-
sics, concerning the investigation of mobile phone devices, tablets, and
other mobile devices like GPS and, overall, smartphones. The last ones,
thanks to their mode of operation, sum up the characteristics and the
problems of all the other digital devices and systems, and, in relation to
their diffusion, now far superior to that of computers, are affirming as a
reference compendium of all the Computer Forensics problems.
The incessant progress of information and communication technologies
promotes many changes in methodologies adopted to notice, collect,
manage e analyse evidences during an investigation.13 The goal of Com-
puter Forensics is not only collection, acquisition and documentation
of data stored on digital devices, but, above all, it is the interpreta-
tion of evidences. Information correlation, through a logical-inferential
reasoning process, is a crucial phase in forensics analyses, because exam-
iner must take into account of all kinds of information (considering the
broadest meaning of term), such as context of investigation, acquired
clues, investigative hypothesis, and many other elements, not necessarily
in digital form. Correlation of these information is the only mean to
allow for the contextualization of digital evidences, promoting them as
clues.
In the procedural stage it often happens that the operations of collecting
and storing digital data are challenged and these problems are due to
the fact of having to work with something not tangible and invisible to
people who do not have specific knowledge on the subject (an example
can be a trace of unlawful activity found in a log file). Moreover, it
should be borne in mind that if once the data were saved exclusively in
digital data storage devices connected to the computer physically used
by the end user, today a lot of information is de-localized from a single
location and stored in a network. Therefore, if a crime is committed
even partially through the use of a network, the tests are distributed on
different computers and in many cases it is not physically possible to
simultaneously collect all the hardware. At the same time, the presence
of a network can induce redundancy, a phenomenon for which a data
not available at one point in the network could be traced to another.
Taking into account the previous considerations, experts have to face
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many challenges during the different phases of forensic investigations:
• the admissibility of acquired data must be preserved;
• the volume and heterogeneity of data requires information extrac-
tion;
• the lack of standard format for file produced by different practices
and tools leads to integration and correlation problems;
• the unification events from multiple sources or devices.
1.2.4 Branches
The excursus of the various definitions, made in Section 1.2.1, confirms
the strictly interdisciplinary nature of Computer Forensics, whose theo-
ries and practices could not leave aside the profound inter-correlations
between Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and law,
in particular criminal law and criminal procedure. In the meantime,
Computer Forensics has evolved and diversified, turning its attention to
the various sectors offered by technological evolution.
In fact, depending on the peculiarities of the devices being analysed
or how data is collected, forensics can be better classified in a certain
number of branches, whose composition may change over time based on
technological development.
Disk forensics Disk forensics is the main and oldest branch of Computer
Forensics. For this reason it is common for the term "disk forensics" to
be replaced by "Computer Forensics" or by the more general "forensic
computer science", and its variants in English. The disk forensics deals
with the analysis of computer media (hard disk, solid state disk, USB
sticks, CD-ROM ...) that can follow different purposes depending on
the role assumed by the same.
The first cases of disk forensics date back to the Seventies, mainly for
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the fight against financial crimes. In 1978 in Florida the issue of the
Computer Crime Actvii formalized its birth with copyright and child
pornography crimes.
Only since the 2000s has emerged the need to define standards and
guidelines that can achieve an adequate level of reliability: to this end,
the National Institute of Justice has published several guidesviii, mainly
intended for law enforcement agencies, aimed at defining the correct
procedures for forensic analysis of digital evidence and for the protection
of the crime scene.
Network forensics The information systems are not confined to the
now small space they occupy but, having a network connection, they
communicate with other systems: especially in recent times and thanks
to the availability of high-speed connection, the possibilities offered by
cloud computing are considerable. For example, it allows remote data
storage. The forensic analysis therefore undergoes all the effects brought
about by the development of technologies based on computer networks,
since the information power provided by the single computer tends to
decrease. Therefore, attention must be extended to remote or even
virtual systems. Without network forensics, there is now the risk of
omitting fundamental data for an investigation.
The network forensics has as its object the forensic analysis techniques
typical of a data transmission system. This discipline presents a consid-
erable complexity as it is forced to follow the data path on a multitude
of systems: for example, in the case of e-mail, the e-mail sent by the
user A to the user B can be found not only on the IT systems in use to
A and B, but also on the intermediate servers crossed.
Cloud forensics The term cloud computing refers to a set of technolo-
gies that allow a Cloud Service Provider to provide to its customers
a variety of data storage and processing services through the use of
virtualized hardware and software resources distributed on the net-
work. According to the definition of the National Institute of Standards
viihttp://www.clas.ufl.edu/docs/flcrimes/chapter2_1.html.
viiihttp://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/digital/pages/welcome.
aspx
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and Technologies (NIST)14ix the main features of the cloud computing
paradigm are: the availability of broadband network connections, the
flexibility in the provision of services, the supply of consumer self-service
services and the sharing of resources among multiple users.
Cloud forensics is one of the most popular and debated topics of the last
years:15,16 the distributed processing of data and the lack of physical
access to the mass memories, sited on the servers distributed in the
cloud, represent a serious problem for the investigator who must review
the techniques of disk and network forensics from the point of view of
the new phenomenon. An example of a cloud service is the email: users
does not need to install and configure any software on their computer,
having the ability to access data remotely from other systems through
an access interface such as a browser.
Mobile forensics Mobile forensics has as its object of investigation
mobile devices, and more in detail, it can be divided into:
• SIM card forensics, in which the analysed object is the content of
the SIM card;
• Mobile Handset Forensics (or Cell Phone Forensics), in which the
analysed object is the content of the mobile device (smartphone,
tablet, mobile phone ...);
• Memory Card Forensics (or Removable Media Forensics), in which
the object analysed is a memory card that could be used to extend
the memory capacity of the memory device; in this case, the
analysis techniques are borrowed from the disk forensics;
• Cellsite Forensics, in which the survey object are telephone records
that contain the traces left by mobile devices along the network,
allowing geo-localization of devices in time and space.
ixhttp://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf
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Embedded forensics Embedded forensics does not have its own cir-
cumstantial dimension due to the extreme diversification of systems: this
branch deals with the forensic analysis of digital systems that can not
be classified in the previous categories. In fact, there are more and more
specialized digital tools that may contain useful tracks for the purpose of
an investigation: think for example in video game consoles (PlayStation,
Xbox ...), intrusion detection systems, computerized systems for car
management, black boxes and so on. Among all, this is probably the
branch that has the greatest criticality because it is extremely difficult to
retrieve information on the acquisition techniques and forensic analysis
of the same.
Multimedia forensics Following the growing popularity of images and
videos in digital format, the need to analyse such data to extract useful
information to be produced as evidence in a process becomes increasingly
frequent: the typical case is that of video surveillance videos recording
the criminal event but they are difficult to use because of poor quality
(resolution, noise ...)17 The multimedia forensics is responsible for
extracting information useful for the purpose of a survey by images
and video, also verifying the authenticity and provenance of the digital
evidence. The use of image and video forensics techniques is necessary
when it is necessary to determine the counterfeiting of a multimedia
data, the evaluation of the reliability of the data (in support of an
accusation or an alibi), to improve the quality or to derive information
(for example, the speed of a car in a video rather than the equipment
used for capture18).
1.3 Computer Forensics as forensic science
The scientific method is the way in which science proceeds to achieve
a knowledge of objective, reliable, verifiable and shareable reality. On
1.4. Scientific evidence 19
the one hand, the collection of empirical evidence is carried out through
experimental observation, on the other hand it has to be done the for-
mulation of hypotheses and theories to be submitted to the examination
of the experiment to test its effectiveness.
Computer Forensics, as a branch of forensic science, requires the knowl-
edge of legal norms and of different operational protocols; the results
are not just for research, but there are jurisprudential constraints and
effects that reflect on personal freedom. Therefore, those who deal with
Computer Forensics should mainly be born as a "man of science", with
appropriate knowledge of some legislative aspects, who must be able to
explain - both in his own reports and in court depositions - the results of
the tests he carried out on findings, in order to communicate effectively
also with the interlocutors who ignore these scientific aspects.
The forensic scientist contributes to the investigative phase by suggesting
and confirming hypotheses with the aim of achieving a faithful recon-
struction of what happened; in the trial phase he intervenes expressing
opinions and evaluations and helping the judge, who remains the peritus
peritorum anyway, to take the final decision.
1.4 Scientific evidence
In recent years, scientific evidence has been overwhelmingly entering
the courtrooms (not only criminal). The scientist uses his knowledge,
his studies, his experiences to produce statements of a general nature.
Instead, jurisdiction operates in exactly the opposite direction because
the judge uses the general knowledge and statements to state something
about specific facts.
This observation has very important implications because no scientific
law, no universal utterance, no matter how certain and cogent in its
implications it is, can tell us everything about the particular case that
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we are asked to solve in a court of justice. In fact, that particular case
is indeed a unicum, while the scientific law speaks of a class of facts.
At the time of admission, recruitment and evaluation, knowledge tools
drawn from science and technology are used, ie scientific principles and
methodologies, technological methods and technical tools whose use
requires expert skills.19
The problem is the verification of how the use of scientific laws, always
changing due to continuous technological progress, can occur in compli-
ance with the principles of due process and in particular the right of
defence, which can not be ignored, pointing out that the conviction can
only be imposed if the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
adjective "reasonable" means "understandable by a rational person" and
therefore through a motivation that makes reference to logical arguments
and that respects the principle of non-contradiction.20
In terms of scientific proof, therefore, the judge should give an account
of the critical evaluation of the degree of control and reliability of the
scientific method, the existence of critical reviews by experts in the
sector, the indication of the margins of known error.
1.4.1 Digital evidence
Digital evidence is the main element of any forensics process. Data
is elementary facts, encoded information that needs an interpretation
to take on meaning and provide knowledge. The computer data is a
representation in a binary system of sequences of bits not immediately
comprehensible to humans, so it requires a series of operations through
which a transformation is performed that can lead to different results
(shown on the monitor in textual representation or as a video, but also
as an image printed on a piece of paper).
By its nature, the digital data is:
1.4. Scientific evidence 21
• immaterial, for which it needs a suitable support to contain it such
as CD-ROM, hard disk, USB sticks;
• volatile, as it can be dispersed quite easily;
• deteriorable, modifiable even in an anonymous and / or involuntary
manner;
• reproducible in a potentially infinite number of copies.
Digital evidence can be considered any data allocated to a particular
device or transmitted by IT and telematic systems that may have some
procedural relevance.21 Any data used to support or refute a thesis in
order to define how an offence has occurred, or to establish the intention
or the alibi is to be called scientific evidence in digital format. According
to ISO/IEC 27037:2012x, a digital evidence is every kind of information
that can be stored or transmitted in a digital form and that can be
considered an evidence.
Literature offers many definitions of digital evidence, such as:
• any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support or
refute a theory of how an offence occurred or that address critical
elements of the offence such as intent or alibi;12
• information of probative value stored or transmitted in digital
form;22
• any digital data that contain reliable information that supports or
refutes a hypothesis about an incident.23
Casey proposes a definition of digital evidence according to which the
digital proof is "any data stored or transmitted using a computer that
support or refute a theory of how an offence occurred or that address
critical elements of the offence such as intent or alibi".12 Next to this it
puts three other definitions:
1. any data that can establish that a crime has been committed or
that can provide a link between a crime and its victim or between
a crime and the person who committed it;
xSee Section 3.2.1
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2. any information with a probative value that is stored or transmitted
in digital formxi;
3. information transmitted or stored in binary format that can be
used in courtxii.
From a purely technical point of view it would be appropriate to distin-
guish digital evidence from electronic evidence in order to put the em-
phasis on data rather than on electronic devices that contain them; this
distinction is acknowledged and explained in the ISO/IEC 27037:2012
standard where are defined separately:
• the "digital data storage device" is defined separately, as an object
containing the digital data of interest;
• the "digital device" and the "peripherals", the latter tools that
allow the digital data to be processed, received or sent to the
external world, but still lacking long-term storage capacity.
The high risk of deterioration makes the digital proofs easily alterable,
damageable or destructible, sometimes even by the same investigators
if not properly prepared to carry out a survey of computer forensics.
The intrinsic weakness of digital evidences make them easy prone to
alterations or modifications, even from examiners that, if not experienced,
may compromise and contaminate the scena criminis status.24 Thus, its
rigorous and authenticated management is of extremely importance.
In25 author has identified three basic properties of digital evidence:
Fidelity refers to Chain of Custody forensic principle, and involves the
adoption of techniques that grant the integrity of evidences through
the process;
Volatility is related to the nature of the support were evidences are
stored (disk, memory, registers, etc.): this property affects consid-
erably the acquisition and analysis of evidences;
xiDefinition proposed by Standard Working Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE).
xiiDefinition proposed by International Organization Computer Evidence (IOCE)
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Latency involves the presence of additional information to contextualize
and interpret a digital encoding. The focus of current work is on
this property.
1.5 The "Repeatability" of the investigations
With the expression Repeatability of the investigations we mean the
possibility to completely re-run the analyses on models absolutely iden-
tical to the original; therefore repeatability is configured as a key factor,
especially when working on crimes, and results must be presented in
trial for an indictment. In other words, we assume the possibility of
carrying out a post-mortem study of the systems, completely limiting the
interactions with the outside world. The digital evidence sources validly
obtained from digital forensics procedures, from the technical-scientific
point of view, should possess the following characteristics: integrity,
consistency and documentation.
Integrity For integrity of the source we mean the possibility of freezing
the evidence found so as not to allow alterability over time. Once the
source has been collected, this procedure entails the proper preservation
of the data.
Consistency The consistency of the source consists in demonstrating
that the information taken during the forensics analyses highlight facts
logically correlated with each other in a temporal sequence that is
coherent with the other procedural information also coming out of the
digital environment.
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Documentation The availability of the documentation details and cer-
tifies the adopted procedures, describing all the steps involved in the
extraction and identification of the sources of evidence, including the
methods and procedures used, the problems encountered, the ad-hoc
solutions adopted, the tools with related version and license, the person-
nel who conducted the analysis with the relevant scientific qualifications,
the chain of custody of the finds from the crime scene to the laboratory,
etc.
1.6 Differences between Forensics and Security
Finally, it is intended to highlight how there is a difference between
Computer Forensics and IT security, although the two areas of activity
are linked. IT security is concerned with protecting data and the
functionality of a system, thus representing an obstacle for computer
forensic because the difficulty in accessing data is high both for those
who intend to commit illegal activities and for those who intend to
use the same data to investigative and trial purposes. The acquisition
of the data contained within the system to be analysed will therefore
require the use of hacking techniques that actually entail the violation
of the system. Computer Forensics intervenes after the system has been
violated and is responsible for preserving the evidences to document
violations of security, as well as identifying potential evidences for crimes
that did not result in the violation of an IT system.
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2.1 Information, data, bit
If the actors of the process want to collect digital data, that have
a high representative capacity and from which is possible to gather
information useful for the purpose of the procedure, then their suitability
to constitute an evidence and the related techniques for their treatment
must be subjected to scientific methodologies and techniques studied by
Computer Forensics.
Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the juridical aspects characterizing
the procedural activity as IT object can not ignore the preliminary
definition of the fundamental concepts of informatics which constitute
the indefeasible premise for a correct scientifically based approach to the
issues that we intend to tackle in the continuation of the discussion.
In European and Italian legislation, we often meet the terms of data,
information, digital document, but rarely the term bit. These are the
terms used in the jurisprudence invested in its application of the law, as
well as by the authors who treated the subject in the doctrinal context.
In truth, these terms are used in a non-univocal way and often as
synonymous, causing confusion in less serious cases and antinomies in
some striking cases. The origin of the nonchalant use of these terms is
undoubtedly identified in the national legislation which, from the way
it approaches or uses them, reveals to ignore the profound ontological
differences between the terms, provoking a heterogenesis of purposes with
respect to the ratio legis. For this reason, the attempt to differentiate the
scope of the terms is essential. The first issue to be addressed concerns
the postulate of forensic informatics, related to the identification of the
object of the study and the techniques of computer forensics, ie the
data.
Data By the term "data" we mean the original, uninterpreted repre-
sentation of a fact, phenomenon or event, carried out through symbols
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(numbers, letters, signs). A datum can be analogical, that is represented
by distinct and continuous or variable symbols with continuity (for ex-
ample the temperature of a body detected by a mercury thermometer),
or digital, that is represented according to a code of well defined and
discontinuous symbols or signals that do not change continuously and
can be read by a computer.
Data must be kept separate from the information: the first is an "origi-
nal, that is uninterpreted, representation of a phenomenon, event or fact,
performed through symbols or combinations of symbols (numbers, letters,
signs) or any another form of expression (vocal, visual, etc.) linked to
any medium (paper, magnetic or optical disks, photographic film, etc.)".
As such, the data does not constitute itself an information, which, for
be inferred, needs a further activity that relates to the data.
Information The information "... derives from a datum, or more likely
from a set of data, that have been subjected to a process of interpreta-
tion, deriving from knowledge oriented by a subject, which has made
them meaningful for the recipient, and really important for the intended
purpose".
The previous definitions make it possible to identify a series of differences
between data and information:
• the data is the input of an information system, information is the
output of the data;
• the data are facts and figures not processed, information is a data
processed;
• the data does not depend on the information, the information
depends on the data;
• the data is not specific, the information is specific;
• the data does not carry meaning, the information must carry a
logical meaning;
• the data is raw material, information is its product.
However, the definition of data contains three important elements:
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1. is a representation that is not interpreted, and therefore objective,
of phenomena, events or facts;
2. is realized through symbols or combinations of symbols of another
sensorially appreciable expression form;
3. is sometimes linked to a support (called medium) that can be of
different materials, suitable to fix the data or to transmit them to
a recipient.
Therefore, the peculiarity of the relationship between data and the media
lies in the fact that the data can be contained on an appropriate medium
and must be composed of symbols that the recipient can understand.
The usefulness of such data construction, when linked to a support that
store it, derives from the possibility of reading it from the support thanks
to a device that can process it.
Information, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that its
usefulness is revealed only to those who deal with the specific subject
and can interpret the symbols constituting the data. Therefore, the
information, precisely because it is the result of an interpretative process
that presupposes an intellectual activity, disregards the support and
instead depends on:
• the recipient or the person performing the interpretative activity,
in fact the same sequence of data can be interpreted by different
people in different ways;
• the context and the time in which it is created;
• the place of creation or destination;
• the source of original data.
Therefore, information is closely linked to the context in which it is
created, used and enjoyed.
Bit In the Information Theory field, the term bit indicates the smallest
existing and imaginable information unit that a system can handle. The
term also has a double notation: the first one refers to the smallest unit
which, according to the binary system, can have a value of 0 or 1;26 the
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second, indicates (a) smallest unit in binary number notation , wich can
have the value 0 or 1 (b) smallest unit of data that a system can handle
(...).
In computer science the use of the term, derived from BInary digiT,26
identifies the minimum amount of information and the elementary choice
between only two possibilities such as, for example true/false, on/off,
present/absent voltage and any other dual dimension, such as yes/no,
white/black, full/empty, left/right. A set of bits is called a string. An
eight-bit string is a byte, which is a sequence used to encode a single
alphanumeric character on a computer. The set of conventions and rules
with which pre-set configurations of bits are used to represent univocally
the numbers, letters, symbols, is called encoding, while coding is called
the operation of transforming letters, numbers, symbols into strings
of bits that a computer (or other device) can store or process. A set
of bytes that constitute a logical agglomeration (text, sounds, images,
movies ...) is called a file. Digitalization is defined as the process of
transforming an analogical data into a digital, that is its representation
through binary coding.
2.1.1 The material nature of the bit
The relation between bits and the medium on which they are stored
rises a question of considerable importance for the definition of the
technical methods and the rules for the correct processing of data for
legal and procedural purposes: are bits material or immaterial? From a
strictly legal point of view, the question is of broad relevance because
the implications deriving from the definition of the "substance" of which
the bits are made constitutes the precondition for the correct juridical
qualification of IT facts. In fact for the jurist called to apply the
rules to concrete cases, it is important to establish whether an object
has a material or immaterial dimension. In fact, some rules, for their
application to the concrete case, presuppose the materiality of the object
as an indefectible element; other rules, on the other hand, when applied
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to intangible objects, imply the direct or indirect adoption of initiatives
aimed at safeguarding the completeness and reliability of information
deriving from the bits. The problem of the materiality or immateriality
of the bit moves above all on the ontological-philosophical plane, so
much so as to constitute for some a fundamental element to elevate the
bit to a paradigm and an instrument of knowledge of reality.
In a fundamental essay on digital themes, to the question "What is a
bit?", the author gave an unequivocal answer: "A bit has no color, size
or weight, and can travel at the speed of light. It is the smallest atomic
element of information’ DNA. It is a way of being: yes or no, true or
false, up or down, inside or outside, black or white. For practicality we
say that a bit is 1 or 0. What the 1 or 0 means is another matter. In
the early days of the computer era, a string of bits generally represented
numeric information (...)".27
However, on a more practical level, the question of the materiality of the
bits imposes to consider the technical aspects concerning the physical
dimension of the bits in relation to the medium on which they are
stored. The types of memories are classified in primary (or central) and
secondary (or mass). At the state of technological progress, a bit, in
its static phase, can not disregard the memory on which it is recorded.
Therefore, the physical size of a bit also depends on the memory technol-
ogy, primary or secondary that is, and on the type of material of which
it is composed.
The bits, besides being statically stored on memory, can also be trans-
mitted by packet switching techniques. In this situation the bits are
transmitted through a network by associating each bit with a physical
phenomenon that can be reproduced remotely through a transmission
means. In this case, the bits are subjected to a further rather complex
coding. Depending on the type of physical phenomenon used, the trans-
mission media used in the networks are currently divided into three
categories:
1. electric means: these are the means used in the past and which,
exploiting the properties of the metals to conduct electrical energy,
allow data transmission by associating the bits with particular
voltage or current values, or certain variations of these quantities;
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2. radio waves (e.g. wireless means): in these technologies, the
physical instrument used to transmit the data associated with the
bits is the electromagnetic wave, that is the combination of an
electric field and a variable magnetic field, which has the property
of propagating in space and reproducing at a distance a electrical
current of a receiving device (antenna);
3. optical means: optical fibers and last lasers, ie very recent trans-
mission technologies that exploit the physical phenomenon of light.
Such transmission means are all based on the transport of some form
of energy which encodes the bits (so called signal) to which the phys-
ical system crossed opposes, thus determining an attenuation of the
transmitted energy. This attenuation is also different depending on the
frequency, so that for each physical system there will be a bandwidth,
that is the set of frequencies that can be transmitted without excessive
attenuation.
Returning to the initial question, that is, if the bits are material or
immaterial, the discussion just carried out leads us to believe that, at
the current state of technology:
1. the bits, and therefore the encoded data, are read from the memory
and stored on the same (or different) by modifying the material of
which the support is made of;
2. the bits processed by the system are subsequently represented by
the system;
3. the bits transmitted, regardless of the technology and the technique
used, are disgusted by any material support and therefore are
immaterial.
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2.1.2 Preserving the integrity of bits
Related to the material or immaterial nature of the bits, there are some
considerations that must always be kept in mind for a correct setting of
the method of data processing for procedural purposes:
need for a memory (hard disk, floppy disk, flash memory): in cases
where the bits are in the static phase, their physical size requires
that you can not assume documents that for the usability do not
need a memory; when instead they are in a dynamic phase, the
correct formation of the information deriving from the bits imposes
that all the bits (or most of them) that are part of the flow are
processed or acquired;
reproducibility in infinite number of copies : thanks to their digital
coding, the strings of bits can be replicated equal to themselves in
an infinite number of strings always perfectly equal to each other,
as verifiable by calculation and comparison of the respective hashi.
volatility : the technology on which primary memories are based, also
called volatile memories, requires continuous power supply, so that
the bits processed by them are not permanently archived, but are
lost if the power supply is stop;
deterioration : the bits stored on the secondary memories only appar-
ently seem to be destined to remain available for a long time; in
reality, the ability to remain legible over time depends on the
technology used for the construction of secondary memories. On a
strictly physical plane, the secondary memories are affected by the
intrinsic limits of the material which they are composed. These
parameters condition the degradation of the bits and therefore
of the data and of the information that can be deduced, so the
bits stored on them are subject to deterioration and illegibility
phenomena that go under the name of "digital obsolescence". This
phenomenon manifests itself for all digitized documents, until they
are unusable;
ihttps://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash
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(almost) anonymous modifiability : by virtue of the mediation of the
hardware and software in the process of creating and storing bits,
they do not have physical elements that make it possible to trace
unequivocally the operator who created, modified, transferred
or deleted them, or to trace the characteristics that establish a
relationship between bit and operator, a relationship that can be
inferred on the basis of information that can be deduced from the
specific physical characteristics of the bits.
These considerations not only constitute the minimal ontological and
physical basis for a correct juridical qualification of the procedural facts
relevant to the matter, but allow the following considerations to be
made regarding the best techniques for the acquisition of the bits and
therefore of the data both in the static phase (Computer forensics) and
dynamic phase (Network forensics).
The findings also confirmed one of the postulates of computer forensics,
ie the need to preserve the integrity of the bits that make up the data
where it is intended to draw information to be used during the trial.
The need to apply all the Computer forensic principles in processing
data for trial use have as sole purpose preserving the integrity of the
sequences of bits in order to guarantee that the information derived can
be reliable for all the parties.
2.2 Proof and Evidence
As mentioned above, digital forensic studies the rules concerning the
processing of digital data for trial use, and in particular their relevance
for probative purposes in a legal procedure. One of the terminological
questions to clarify concerns precisely the definition of terms such as
proof, means of proof (147), evidence and digital evidence that, although
frequently recurrent in the field of computer forensics, are erroneously
used as synonyms.
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From a legal point of view, and according to the best classification148,
the term "proof " can have at least four different meanings: source of
proof, means of proof, evidence and evidential result.
Source of proof means "everything that is suitable to provide appreciable
results for the judge’s decision, such as a person, a document, a
thing...", and sometimes the source of proof is the source of the
evidence.
Means of proof is the instrument with which a trial element is acquired
in the process which is used for the decision, such as a testimonyii.
Evidence is composed by the raw data obtained from the source of
proof, when it has not yet been evaluated by the judge.
Evidential result is what the Judge obtains as a result of the assessment
of the credibility of the source and of the reliability of the element
obtained.
The evidence tout-court can therefore be defined as the logical process
that derives the existence of the fact to be proved from the known
fact. The fact is that the clue and the means of proof assume the
term "evidence" tout-court only after the outcome of the search, the
admission, the assumption and the evaluation of the means of proof
and then, after the completion of the decisional syllogism made by the
judge, that is the decision transfused in its provision, sentence, order
or decree. Secondly, until 2015, the Italian code did not comprehend
a (sub) category that could be defined as a means of digital evidence
or digital proof or IT documentary proof. With the introduction of art.
234 bis entitled "Documents and computer data"iii, in the Italian legal
system it is possible to speak, even formally, of a means of documental
digital evidence. The concept of "digital evidence" derives from the
transposition of the concept that can be found in the Common Law
system, which, by providing for the legal category of evidence, where
it relates to a set of digital data, may also include the sub-category of
digital evidence.
iiArt. 194 of Italian c.p.p.
iiiArt. 2, comma 1 bis del D.L. 18 febbraio 2015 n. 7, converted with L. 17 April
2016, n. 43, “Integrazione delle misure di prevenzione e contrasto delle attività
terroristiche”.
2.3. Italian Legislation 35
Again from a legal point of view, regarding the use that forensic op-
erators intend to make of digital data taken from electronic devices
and systems, it is undeniable that they are fully part of the scientific
evidence(167). In truth, the scientific content related to digital data
pertains to the modalities with which they must be treated in order to
preserve the information assets useful for the proceeding. In this regard,
it highlights the whole question of the method used in data processing
and therefore the best methods, also called best practices, protocols,
guidelines, standards that include the best data processing techniques
for procedural purposes, which will be addressed in the following.
2.3 Italian Legislation
On the subject there is no homogeneity in the normative production;
the discipline can be traced back to at least three areas of interest:
crimes committed through the use of new technologies (criminal law
of information technology), electronic documents and the security of
information systems, the protection of personal data. In all cases it is a
recent regulatory production, developed over the last twenty years. IT
crimes are regulated in the penal code and in some subsequent special
laws.
2.3.1 Law n. 547/93 on computer crimes
Computer crimes were introduced into Italian regulatory system for the
first time by Law n. 547 of 1993iv. The first novel in the matter of
ivLaw 23 December 1993 n. 547, "Modificazioni ed integrazioni alle norme del codice
penale e del codice di procedura penale in tema di criminalità informatica"
36 2. Legal Aspects of Digital Forensics
computer crimes inserted a series of new cases to "update" the traditional
areas of protection from attacks on IT assets or through IT tools. The
following forecasts were of particular importance:
• the arbitrary exercise of his own reasons with violence on things
was supplemented by the prediction of violence on the computer
program and on the computer or telecommunications system (Ar-
ticle 392, paragraph 2, paragraph 1);
• on the subject of damage, the rules on the damaging of computer
or electronic systems (Article 635 bis of the Criminal Code) and on
the dissemination of programs aimed at damaging or interrupting
an IT or telematic system (Article 615 quinquies of the Criminal
Code) were introduced;
• the law that already punished the attack on public utility facilities
(Article 420 of the Italian Civil Code) was supplemented by the
provision relating to IT and telematic systems;
• the protection of the domicile was extended to the digital domicile,
providing for crimes such as the unauthorized access to an IT or
telematic system (Article 615 ter of the Criminal Code), the im-
proper possession and dissemination of access codes to IT systems
(Article 615 quater cp);
• computer fraud (article 640 ter c.p.), was outlined on the model
of traditional fraud;
• the falsification of the IT document (Article 491 bis of the Civil
Code) extended the cases of false documents;
• the crimes of interception, impediment or illegal interruption of
digital or electronic communications (article 617 quater of the
Italian Criminal Code), of the installation of equipment designed
to intercept, prevent or interrupt computer or electronic com-
munications (Article 617 quinquies of the Criminal Code), and
falsification, alteration or suppression of the content of computer
or electronic communications (article 617 sexies cp), in order to
protect correspondence and electronic communications;
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• the extension of the applicability of the rules set out in articles
from 617 to 617 sexies c.p. remote transmissions of sounds, images
or other data (623 bis 6 c.p.).
The only rule introduced in the code of criminal procedure was that
concerning the interception of electronic flows. Therefore, Law 547/93
did not affect the evidence’s regime, nor did it provide anything in terms
of digital evidence. However, Law 547/93 on the one hand represented
the first attempt to adapt the system to the new demands imposed
by the digital revolution, on the other it is the first sign of the poor
understanding of new digital phenomena from part of legislator, proven
by the inclination to adapt the pre-existing regulatory frameworks to
completely new and only apparently similar realities. This inclination
was then confirmed in the subsequent law which modified the procedural
rules.
2.3.2 Law n. 48/08 - Convention on Cybercrime ratification
The study of the issues related to the investigation of cybercrimes can
not today leave aside the most important novelty in the field of forensic
science such as the Ratification Law of the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrimev, the normative text of 2001 which represents the first
international agreement on the subject crimes committed through IT
and telematic systems, Internet and other computer networks.
The Convention, adopted by the Council of Europe, was prepared by a
Committee composed of 22 experts coming from some of the 41 Council
countries, of observers coming from important countries outside Europe
(USA, Canada, Japan, South Africa) and of delegates of some of the
major international organizations (Interpol, European Union, Unesco).
vLaw 18 March 2008, n. 48. “Ratifica ed esecuzione della Convenzione del Consiglio
d’Europa sulla criminalità informatica, fatta a Budapest il 23 novembre 2001, e
norme di adeguamento dell’ordinamento interno”.
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It was opened for signature in Budapest on November 23, 2001 and
immediately signed by 30 countries, including Italy.
The Cybercrime Convention aims to harmonize cyber-crimes, to estab-
lish a rapid and effective international cooperation regime, to create
a supranational common legislation, to provide for more streamlined
procedures in the context of seizures, searches and interceptions, to
assign powers necessary for the prosecution of this type of crimes in
national procedural law. Moreover it has the task of outlining common
definitions of crime between countries, defining common powers of inves-
tigation and preparing means of international cooperation. In the first
chapter, consisting of a single article, the following four definitions are
preliminarily provided:
"computer system" means any equipment or group of interconnected
or connected equipment, one or more of which, on the basis of a
program, perform automatic data processing;
"computer data" means any presentation of facts, information or con-
cepts in a form likely to be used in a computerized system, including
a program capable of enabling a computerized system to perform
a function;
"service provider" means any public or private entity that provides
users of its services the ability to communicate through an IT
system, as well as any other entity that processes or stores IT
data on behalf of such communication service or for users of this
service;
"data transmission" means any computerized information related to a
communication through an information system that constitutes
a part of the communication chain, indicating the origin of the
communication, the destination, the route, the time, the date, the
size , duration or type of service.
In the second chapter of the Convention the measures to be taken at
national level on substantive criminal law are enucleated. In particular,
Articles 2 to 10 regulate a series of criminal cases that must necessarily
be present in all signatory States in order to guarantee homogeneity of
the indictments. The other articles are aimed at regulating the liability
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of legal persons and applicable sanctions (Articles 11 to 13) and the
definition of the procedural law (Articles 14 to 22), within which the
rules concerning the modalities for timely ensure electronic data that
can be altered or modified are particularly relevant. The third chapter
lays down the provisions on international cooperation regarding mutual
assistance with provisional measures - rapid storage and dissemination
of computer data - as well as investigative powers.
On July 1, 2004 the condition was reached for the entry into force of the
Convention, which was established when five ratifications were reached,
of which at least three of the Council of Europe states.
Although in the name explicitly refers to cybercrime, the scope of the
Budapest Cybercrime Convention is of utmost importance for all legal
practitioners as it includes not only pure IT crimes, but also all "common"
crimes committed through an IT system or which evidences are in digital
format.
The Italian Law of 18 March 2008, n. 48, cd. "Ratification and execution
of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, made in Budapest
on November 23, 2001, and rules for the adaptation of the internal
legal system", makes limited modifications to the penal code, since
Italy has already provided for the introduction of IT crimes in national
law in previous years. Some important rules regarding the acquisition
and recovery of data on which to undertake a forensic investigation
are introduced in the code of criminal procedure: in relation to IT
or telematic systems, the new formulation of art. 244 comma 2 c.p.p.
provides for the need to adopt technical measures aimed at ensuring the
preservation of the original data and preventing alteration; in all cases
where there is a well-founded reason to believe that data, information,
computer programs or traces in any case relevant to the offence are in
an IT or telematic system, the new formulation of art. 247, paragraph
1-bis of the Italian Civil Code, provides for the search to be carried out
by adopting technical measures aimed at ensuring the preservation of
the original data and preventing it from being altered.
With this law the legislator confirmed the propensity, already manifested
with Law 547/93, to set up new standards in existing structures that
should have responded to the needs of regulatory modernization. This
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time, the regulatory intervention concerned certain provisions of the
criminal procedure code, with the aim of fight cybercrime and electronic
crime. Beyond the intentions, the law 48/08 should be recognized the
merit of having turned a light on the problem of processing digital data
for procedural purposes and to have sensitized the forensic operators
on the need to adapt the remaining rules to the demands imposed by
technological progress in the IT field.
On the other hand, in addition to the adaptation of some provisions of
substantive criminal law already introduced by Law 547/93, the Italian
legislator has limited itself to modifying the procedural rules concerning
jurisdiction, acts at the initiative of the judicial police and the means
of searching the test, editing the code and the pre-existing rules with
additions and incisions, but without any intervention on the means of
proof with digital content in the direction of the implementation of
the digital evidence.28–32 So, one of the most serious shortcomings, the
Italian legislator has failed to bring the definition of data or IT data
into our system, denying them the rank of an independent legal asset
worthy of protection.
Therefore, the legislation to be implemented in the national systems
was limited to providing for the procedures to which the processing of
digital data subject to investigation must be subjected, as well as the
technical procedures for the preservation of intact and reliable data, to
protect the representative assets and therefore information that may
derive from it.
From these considerations it follows that the data of which part of the
proceeding, judicial police, public prosecutor, or other party, intends to
use, have probative value only if they constitute a faithful "representation
of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for digital processing",
and not if they result in a partial, erroneous, misleading, or worse,
misrepresentative or even altered reality.
The achievement of this objective is delimited by two jambs: the first is
constituted by the procedural rules governing the investigation activity
to be applied in light of the rights recognized by the international
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conventions and by the Italian Constitution vi;
the other jamb is instead constituted by the technical standards based on
scientific principles proper of the Informatics and organized to guarantee
to the computer data the integrity of the representative capacity of the
facts, information and concepts for probative purposes. The architrave is
made up of the Computer Forensics methods which connect and stabilize
the two areas.
The procedural and collaboration rules provided for by the Convention,
while not imposing or indicating specific technical and scientific instru-
ments that implement the precautions imposed in the processing of data
for procedural use, imply their adoption. See, for example, the art. 19
of the Convention concerning
"(...) Search and seizure of stored computer data":
viKey point of Budapest Convention preamble: “(...) Mindful of the need to en-
sure a proper balance between the interests of law enforcement and respect for
fundamental human rights as enshrined in the 1950 Council of Europe Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966 United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other applicable
international human rights treaties, which reaffirm the right of everyone to hold
opinions without interference, as well as the right to freedom of expression, includ-
ing the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, and the rights concerning the respect for privacy; Mindful
also of the right to the protection of personal data, as conferred, for example, by
the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data; (...)” transfused in art. 15 of
Convention: ”(...) Article 15 - Conditions and safeguards 1 Each Party shall
ensure that the establishment, implementation and application of the powers and
procedures provided for in this Section are subject to conditions and safeguards
provided for under its domestic law, which shall provide for the adequate protection
of human rights and liberties, including rights arising pursuant to obligations it
has undertaken under the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1966 United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other applicable international human
rights instruments, and which shall incorporate the principle of proportionality.
2 Such conditions and safeguards shall, as appropriate in view of the nature of
the procedure or power concerned, inter alia, include judicial or other independent
supervision, grounds justifying application, and limitation of the scope and the
duration of such power or procedure. 3 To the extent that it is consistent with the
public interest, in particular the sound administration of justice, each Party shall
consider the impact of the powers and procedures in this section upon the rights,
responsibilities and legitimate interests of third parties”.
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1. Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other mea-
sures as may be required to empower its competent au-
thorities to search or similarly: a computer system or
part of it and computer data stored therein; and b a
computer-data storage medium in which computer data
may be stored in its territory.
2. each Party shall adopt that legislation and other mea-
sures as a requirement for the use of the search system
or similarly access to a specific computer system or part
of it, pursuant to paragraph 1.a, is stored in another
computer system or part of it in its territory, and it is
possible to extend the search or similar access to the
other system.
3. Each Party shall adopt the following: legislative and
other measures as may be required to empower the com-
petent authorities to seize or similarly
a) seize or similarly secure a computer system or part
of it or a computer-data storage medium;
b) make and retain a copy of those computer data;
c) maintain the integrity of the relevant stored com-
puter data;
d) render inaccessible or remove those computer data
in the accessed computer system.
4. Each Party shall adopt such legislation and other mea-
sures as may be necessary to empower its competent
authorities to order any person who has the knowledge
of the computer system or measures to protect the com-
puter data to be provided, as is reasonable, the necessary
information, to enable the undertaking of the measures
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
5. The powers and procedures referred to in this article
shall be subject to Articles 14 and 15. (...)
Well, the purposes set by the 3rd paragraph, lett. a), b), c), d), in
addition to being subject to regulatory provisions can be implemented
with "other measures" which can not be other than technical measures.
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Such measures, being necessarily informatics, will have to guarantee
the aims set by the legislative norms, with the proper techniques of the
computer science, and therefore with measures that base their technical
value on the scientific principles of the information technology. On the
contrary, if those purposes set by legislative measures were pursued with
non-scientific instruments, the same objectives could not be achieved.
In this regard, the Italian legislator has not typified specific data pro-
cessing techniques for procedural purposes, a choice that, in light of the
continuous technological progress, appears to be acceptable. Therefore,
Digital Forensics, taking into account the aims pursued by law, turns
its attention to computer science to acquire the methods that make
them on a scientific basis so as not to depress representative loyalty and
therefore the evidential effectiveness of computer data.
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3.1 Best practices in Digital Forensics
In regulating the modus operandi of the operations, it can be observed
how the attention of the legislator has focused, rightly, more on the
result that must be obtained rather than on the method to be followed:
the canonization within legal norms of technical procedures more that to
represent a guarantee, would have led, in the long run, to contrary and
distorting effects represented by the constant evolution of the discipline
and by the peculiarities peculiar to each case (see Section 3.2.1).
The Law 48/08 has introduced some recurrent principles in all the rules
of the criminal procedure code in order to guarantee the reliability of
the data object of the processing for procedural purposes, but does not
fix the technical specifications. On this point, a large field of experts has
simplistically invoked the need for investigative best practices, believing
that a uniform protocol can be the solution to problems. In reality, this
approach neglects that forensic IT techniques can not be proceduralized
because they are only subjected to scientific verification and validation.
Secondly, authorities lack the power to set procedures in best practice;
moreover, the application of the law can not be subordinated to the
existence or application of extra-legal rules; finally, technological progress
is so rapid that every best practice would undergo a process of rapid
obsolescence, because it is difficult to hypothesize such proactive best
practices as to anticipate the placing on the market of new devices or
software (think, for example, of the need to acquire data relating to a
crime committed with a mobile phone just placed on the market).
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3.1.1 Best practices definition
Especially in the period prior to Law 48/08, operators engaged in
investigations concerning IT data, have felt the need for shared practical
methodologies, indicated as best practices, guidelines, criteria, etc., for
the implementation of data processing techniques for forensic purposes.
In a broader sense, for best practicei we mean the "set of activities
(procedures, behaviours, habits, etc.) that, organized in a systematic way,
can be taken as a reference and reproduced to favor the achievement of the
best results in the business, engineering, health, education, government
environment and so on". The expression also refers to the process of
development and application of operating standards used by complex
organizations, but there are equivalent expressions. In the field of
computer forensics, best practice has often referred to practices developed
overseas by federal agencies or by associations operating in the sector
considered a point of reference for the approach to the technical-IT
aspects of Computer Forensic.33–37
3.1.2 Inadequacy of the procedural law
The debate that took place in the first half of the 2000s began with
real problems such as the inadequacy of the procedural law that did
not provide for references or technical indications to be adopted, the
inadequacy of the investigative procedures, not sufficiently developed,
the inadequate technical training of the employees and the scarcity of the
means available to the operators. However, it can be assumed that it was
above all the judicial police that needed guidelines to best direct their
ifrom Wikipedia: "A best practice is a method or technique that has been generally
accepted as superior to any alternatives because it produces results that are
superior to those achieved by other means or because it has become a standard
way of doing things, e.g., a standard way of complying with legal or ethical
requirements."
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activities to allow the results of the investigation to "resist" during the
trial. The debate on best practices in Computer forensics has therefore
focused on various elements:
• about the object to be defined, the need to outline uniform tech-
nical procedures for the standard processing of digital data for
procedural purposes was highlighted;
• about their purpose, was identified in the need to provide theo-
retical and practical support to the technical investigation and
investigation of the Judicial Police, the public prosecutor and the
related consultants;
• with regard to the figures to be involved, some forensic operators
were identified, and therefore essentially judicial police officers,
magistrates, lawyers, technicians;
• on the recognition to best practices of a privileged procedural
effectiveness, and therefore the presumption of the validity of the
procedures followed and the binding nature of all the parts of the
process.
However, at the best examination, this approach revealed serious limita-
tions, which can be summarized as follows:
• regarding the object of the best practices of Computer Forensics,
the lack of legal principles regarding the processing of digital data
for the purposes of proof emerged clearly, moreover established by
the first jurisprudence attested on positions still behind;
• the objectives pursued, in the absence of principles and reference to
the possibility of mutability in the field of defensive investigations,
concretized the risk of the instrumentalization of the procedures
by the persons involved in the investigation and investigation
activities;
• as far as the editors of the best practices were concerned, no
valid selection criteria were highlighted in the context of a valid
academic and scientific course, thus remaining the expression of
a voluntary and extemporary activity; moreover, the omitted
indication of the auxiliaries of the proceeding as subjects to be
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involved (chancellors, bailiffs, custodians), constituted an index of
the fundamental error proving a partial, and therefore unscientific,
approach to the question;
• finally, with regard to the procedural effectiveness of best prac-
tices, it was unaware that their privileged effectiveness would have
conditioned the judge (and judgment) by simultaneously violating
the constitutional and procedural principles of subjection of the
judge solely to the law (Article 101, c. 2 of the Constitution),
of the formation of the judge’s free conviction (article 192), of
the adversarial and of the formation of the trial during the trial
(article 111 of the Constitution).
3.2 Computer Forensics ISO standards
Until October 2012 the methodologies were defined in some best practices
of the sector, aimed at outlining the paradigms of technical action in the
forensic field, through a basic methodology aimed at: a) acquiring the
test without altering or damaging the device original; b) authentication
of the find and image (bit stream image) acquired; c) to guarantee the
repeatability of the assessment; d) an analysis without modification of
the original data; e) maximum impartiality in technical action.
On a practical level, however, the implementation and development
of shared procedures clash with two orders of limits, attributable, on
the one hand, to the "technological variable" represented by both the
characteristics of the media in which the data are contained and the
habitat technology in which the device is inserted and operates (consider,
for example, the acquisition of data contained within a hard disk in a
trust computing environment, that is equipped with mechanisms for
encrypting content); on the other hand, he observes the "subjective
variable", constituted by the subject operating and by the objectives
connected to the action: for the Police Forces the aim will be to acquire
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useful elements for the investigations while preserving their authenticity,
for the Judiciary it will be such findings to facts of a criminal nature,
for the Technical Advisor of the defense or the defender in the field of
defensive investigations will be to check that the processes followed allow
an appropriate exercise of the right of defense.38
For example, the rules modified by Law 48/08 provide that the paradig-
matic procedure to be carried out when the data are processed for
judicial purposes, consists in the production of a copy of the data that
must be carried out on adequate supports, through a procedure that
ensures conformity of the copy to the original and its immutability,
adopting technical measures aimed at ensuring the preservation of the
original data and preventing its alteration; furthermore, the procedure
may provide for the affixing to the copy of the electronic or computer
seal. The tools that implement this obligation are the bit-by-bit image,
on durable secondary memories, verified through the hash, digitally
signed and marked temporally.
Moreover, some researchers working at the Department of Computer
forensics in Bologna have developed the empirical procedures that have
implemented the principles of the Convention (use of optical media, dig-
ital signature, calculation of hash by appropriate algorithms, etc.) that
give technical form the precepts just examined, which were considered
scientifically founded, and which recently met the endorsement of the
ISO 2012:27037 standard.
Among the various standards promoted by the ISO, documents relating
to Computer Forensics have recently been submitted, which are candi-
dates for effective and internationally recognized technical standards of
reference:
• ISO/IEC 27037:2012, issued in definitive version on October 15,
2012 with regard to guidelines for the identification, collection,
acquisition and storage of digital tests;
• ISO/IEC 27041, with regard to guidelines on the guarantee of
suitability and adequacy of the methods of investigation;
• ISO/IEC 27042, related to guidelines for the analysis and inter-
pretation of digital evidence;
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• ISO/IEC 27043, concerning principles and processes for the inves-
tigation of IT incidents.
3.2.1 ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard
The ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard is a document that in its definition
refers to other ISO/IEC standardsii and contains some guidelines that
can certainly be considered as the operational reference in the field
of computer forensics for the identification, collection, acquisition and
preservation of the digital evidences, necessary in any investigation
that needs to maintain the integrity of digital evidence. The standard
aims to provide guidance to those responsible for identifying, collecting,
capturing and storing potential digital evidence:
• the Digital Evidence First Responders (DEFR), authorized, pre-
pared and qualified to intervene first on the scene of an incident
by collecting and acquiring the digital tests with responsibility for
their management;
• the Digital Evidence Specialists (DES), a subject that performs
the duties of an DEFR and has specialist knowledge, skills and
abilities in managing a wide variety of technical issues;
• incident response specialists;
• managers of computer forensics laboratories.
iiISO/TR 15801 - Document management - Information stored electronically -
Recommendations for trustworthiness and reliability.
ISOI/IEC 17020 - Conformity assessment - Requirements for the operation of
various types of bodies performing inspection.
ISO/IEC 17025:2005 - General requirements for the competence of testing and
calibration laboratories.
ISO/IEC 27000 - Information technology - Security techniques - Information
security management systems - Overview and vocabulary.
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The document provides that the responsible parties manage the potential
digital evidences with methodologies that are adequate on a global scale,
with the aim of facilitating the investigation of digital devices and tests
in a systematic and impartial manner, while preserving their integrity
and authenticity. The standard also aims to provide information to
decision-makers who need to determine the reliability of digital evidence.
It is applicable to organizations that need to protect, analyse and present
the potential digital evidences, ie the data that can be obtained from
different types of digital devices, network devices, databases and anything
else provided already in digital format (the standard doesn’t provide for
analog/digital conversion).
Because of the fragility of digital evidence, it is necessary to put in
place an appropriate methodology to ensure the integrity and authen-
ticity of potential digital evidence: the standard does not address the
methodology of legal processes, disciplinary procedures and other actions
related to management potential digital evidence that is unrelated to
the purpose of identification, collection, acquisition and storage.
Applying the standard requires compliance with national laws, rules
and regulations, will not replace the specific legal requirements of a
jurisdiction while serving as a practical guideline for any DEFR or
DES in investigations involving potential digital evidence. It does not
extend to the analysis of digital evidence and does not replace specific
jurisdictional requirements that relate to instances such as eligibility,
persuasive value, relevance and other limitations subject to judicial
control of the use of potential digital evidence in the courtrooms. The
standard can help in simplifying the exchange between jurisdictions of
potential digital evidence. In order to maintain the integrity of digital
evidence, operators are required to adapt and correct the procedures
described in compliance with the legal requirements of the evidences
required by the specific jurisdiction. The ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard
integrates the ISO/IEC 27001iii and ISO/IEC 27002iv standards, and in
particular, the control requirements regarding the acquisition of potential
iiiISO/IEC 27001:2013 - ISO/IEC 27001 - Information security management
ivISO/IEC 27002:2013 - Information technology - Security techniques - Code of
practice for information security controls.
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digital evidences, offering an additional application address, as well as
being applied in independent contexts two standards mentioned.
3.3 Digital Forensics phases
Taking up the definition of forensics, that is "the set of techniques and
tools used to identify, acquire, analyse, evaluate and present the evi-
dence found on a computer or other device", we can identify five different
phases in it. So, in the literature, forensics has always been defined in
five (sometimes four) phases:39 identification; acquisition (with collec-
tion and conservation); analysis; evaluation and presentation (in the
four-stage versions, the latter two were grouped). However, taking into
consideration the various definitions of computer forensics, the state of
technology, various guidelines defined in the best practices and, lastly,
how correctly defined and illustrated within the ISO/IEC standards on
the topic, the process of computer science forensic would more correctly
be divided into seven phases according to the following scheme: iden-
tification; collection; acquisition; conservation and transport; analysis;
evaluation; presentation.
Identification The identification phase consists in searching evidences
useful to the case. The digital evidence has a physical form and a logical
form: the physical form is given by the technique of impression of data
on the support (for example, magnetization of matter in the case of
magnetic supports or the representation in pit and land of optical media);
the logical form is the virtual representation of the data in bits that
can take the value of 0 or 1. Identification is the process of research,
recognition and documentation of potential tests in digital format, ie
bit storage devices that may be relevant to the investigation, identifying
where possible also data that can be found outside or in virtual spaces
such as cloud systems. However, this is not just a simple search for
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devices, but the right priorities must be defined taking into account
the risk of data volatility, in order to minimize the damage to potential
digital evidence and obtain the most intact and genuine data.40
This is probably one of the most difficult phase of the whole investiga-
tion, because today everyone is surrounded by dozens of supports that
can store (or conceal) information. The investigator doesn’t have to
underestimate any element [GF09], but rather he has to consider any
secondary functions of some devices, for example:
• multimedia players (mp3/mp4) can be used as generic mass storage
devices;
• USB drives (mouse, hub, small desktop gadgets ...) can contain
small flash disk memories;
• some printers may have a network interface that can be used as a
file repository.
Collection The collection phase consists in obtaining "materially" the
data to be analysed. The forms through which it can be implemented
are the duplication or the seizure.
The most common findings are computers, which very often are not
handled correctly during the seizure phase, not considering the fact
that they have easily alterable storage media. If a computer is found
turned on, it is advisable to make some considerations before proceeding
further. First of all it is essential to understand what data to expect
compared to the considered crime. In some cases it may be necessary to
make a copy of the RAM memory, which loses its contents at shutdown,
to ascertain which programs were running at the precise moment of
the seizure. Then it is necessary to evaluate the best shutdown mode,
between standard shutdown (shutdown) and the disconnection from the
power supply (unplugging). The former is usually inadvisable because it
causes numerous modifications to the system files, but the latter could
be fatal for old or delicate hardware, with the risk to make the machine
unusable.
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Once the digital devices have been identified, the computer scientist (or
rather the DEFR according to the indications of the ISO/IEC 27037:2012
standard) must decide whether to proceed immediately with the acqui-
sition or whether to proceed with the support collection operations that
will be followed by the acquisition operations. Collection is the phase of
digital data processing in which devices that may contain potential digi-
tal evidence are removed from their original location to be transported
to a laboratory or, more generally, to another controlled environment
for the acquisition and the subsequent analysis. Each finding must be
labelled with the case number, a description, the date and time of col-
lection and the name of the person who detected it. Devices containing
potential digital evidences may be in the on state or in the off state.
Depending on the state and purpose of the investigation, as well as the
legal limits, different methodologies and tools may be required.
Usually the form preferred by law enforcement is the seizure, whose
critical point is only the care of the physical support and the correct
maintenance of the chain of custody. However, it has some advantages:
• simplicity and tranquillity: the collection of the physical medium
does not require the particular technical knowledge necessary for
the acquisition, although the removal of digital storage media still
requires some skills; moreover, the postponement of the acquisition
operation helps to loosen the tension in critical moments of a seizure
activity, avoiding errors;
• rapidity: the collection simply requires the annotation of the
identification details of the support in a report, in addition to the
workload required for transport;
• tangibility: the tangibility of the support conveys greater peace
of mind to the operators and to the suspect who may not have
adequate technical and legal knowledge to evaluate the current
technical activity;
• preservation of further non-digital tests: in addition to the digital
data, an IT evidence could be used to detect other types of tests
such as fingerprints.
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The alternative procedure, is the duplication of the medium through
bit-to-bit copies, which can be necessary under different circumstances
where physical collection is not possible:
• IT systems that can not be turned off: these are systems that
deliver critical services in 24/7 mode; for example, systems for
controlling the exchange of railway tracks;
• IT systems that provide services to third parties: these are sys-
tems that typically located in datacenters and provide resources,
both computational and storage, to various users, allowing them
to reduce costs by centralizing the investment of hardware and
software, as well as the costs for the system activity; for example,
systems of hosting service providers that host websites;
• virtual systems: these are systems that simulate a real machine
whose physical consistency is that of the system on which the
activity is performed.
In any case, the collection process must not be limited to the device
that contains the digital data but must be extended to the material that
concerns it, such as, for example, post-it with passwords, notebooks
with notes and power supplies. Furthermore, the collection process must
be documented in detail to justify the choice of one method instead
of another. The IT media must be carefully packaged away from heat
sources so as not to risk corrupting the media and causing accidental
data loss.
The following scheme in Figure 3.1, taken from the ISO/IEC 27037:2012
standard, highlights the evaluation process by the DEFR regarding the
possibility of making a collection or acquisition. Based on the choice
made, the same standard provides detailed procedures to follow.
If you were to tend to collect, in the case of devices turned off the scheme
in Figure 3.2 is to follow.
Instead, when you come into contact with a turned on device, the scheme,
reported in Figure 3.3, is more complex because it requires the evaluation
of some elements that would be lost permanently after switching off the
system.
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Figure 3.1: Decision-making policy about the opportunity to collect or acquire
potential digital evidence taken from the ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard
Figure 3.2: Guidelines for the collection of turned off digital devices, taken
from the ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard
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Figure 3.3: Guidelines for the collection of turned on digital devices, taken
from the ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard
Note that after switching off the system (with unplugging or with normal
shutdown), the procedure is based on that of the previous diagram for
the devices switched off.
Acquisition Acquisition is the process of producing a copy of digital
evidence called a forensic copy (or bit-stream image, or a bitmap image),
which is a complete copy of the media including unallocated space and
slack spacev. The operating methods and tools to be used depend on
the situation, cost and timing, but in any case must be documented in
detail so that they are, where possible, reproducible and verifiable by a
technical consultant of one of the other parties. The acquisition process
must be as least invasive as possible, ie it must involve the alteration of
the least possible number of bits, possibly aiming at the inalterability of
the source support, in order to produce a sequence of bits representing
vSlack space is a set of digital data generated by the way the data is organized
into a storage medium. Regardless of the file size, media are structured in fixed-
size blocks (sectors). Any unused space within the block will contain data that
existed until the time of deletion and will continue to contain it until the space is
overwritten as a result of wiping or new file allocation
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the original sequence. The final product of an acquisition can therefore
be a clone, ie a device that contains the exact and identical sequence
of the source device, or an image file (or a series of fragmented files)
that represent the exact and identical sequence of the device source;
in the second case it is possible to apply compression algorithms as in
the case of the Expert Witness formatvi. The identity between source
and destination can be easily proved by hash algorithms, mathematical
functions that allow to synthesize the representation of millions of bits
in hexadecimal strings of a few tens of bits: in fact, the application of a
same hash function to two bit sequences always produces the same result
(digest), if and only if the two input sequences are identical. It should
be noted that in some circumstances - such as the live acquisitionvii of
a system - this verification is not possible, therefore, it is necessary to
resort to an in-depth documentation of the acquisition process, also by
means of video and photographic recording.
If the machine is still on at the time of the seizure, it is necessary to
carry out a first immediate analysis on site because the shutdown would
result in the loss of volatile data in RAM memory or in the swap area
and the inaccessibility of data protected by encryption. Live analysis
must therefore verify network connections, open ports, running process
and their behaviour, current users, files, kernel modules and devices in
use.41
It can then be switched off and disconnected from the network to conduct
post-mortem analysis, ie with the machine turned off, which consists of
a survey of resident data (data files and programs), system file and logs
analysis.
The investigations should not be carried out on the original hard disk
but on a copy of the bit stream: the physical copy compared to the
logical one allows to preserve data apparently not present on the disk
that are instead highlighted with a forensic analysis.
viEWF is a proprietary data format used for forensic copies devised by EnCase but
now supported by most forensic software.
viiThe term live forensics indicates a method of acquiring information from an IT
system while it is operating, in order to capture those data, transiting or stored
in it, which would not be acquired id the device is turned off.
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Bit-stream image acquisition procedure The procedure for the ac-
quisition and copying of data constitutes a crucial event during the
investigation of IT data. At present, the best method for acquiring data
from a memory is the production of a c.d. bit-stream image, or bit-by-bit
image, which, due to the procedural value, is also called "forensic copy",
ie a complete copy of the memory on which the bits are stored, including
unallocated spaces, those apparently unallocated and slack spaces, and
in ways that do not involve alteration of data (for example, creation
dates, last access, last modification). In fact, cases may occur in which
not only the data that "appear" are stored on the memory, ie those that
are immediately usable, but also others that are not visible because
they are deleted, or stored in particular ways, such as encryption or
steganography or both simultaneously. The deletion of data from a
memory through the standard procedures provided by the operating
systems, unless it is carried out with particular techniques of wiping,
that go to overwrite the data, it concerns only the index that allows you
to rebuild the documents so that the user can no longer access them.
However, the data c.d. deleted, as long as they are not overwritten, they
are still stored in the memory and therefore potentially recoverable and
analysable.
The same goes for the data recorded in the slack space. To understand
the phenomenon we must start from the organization of the memory
which is structured in blocks (sectors) of fixed size. The bits are stored
on these blocks, regardless of the file size. When the files are smaller
than the blocks, more or less large area of memory will remain unused.
But if in that area had already been stored data of files subsequently
deleted, in the area inside the blocks remained unused by the archiving
of subsequent files will continue to insist data of previously archived files
and will continue to be stored there until the space is not overwritten
by following allocation of new files or wiping operations.
Therefore, the data acquisition and copying process must be carried out
in such a way as not to alter any bit of the original memory and must
be integral, that is (tend to) realize a sequence of bits to be stored on a
destination memory that perfectly represents the original bit sequence
stored on the source memory. To this aim, between the memory on
which the original data are stored and the destination memory of the
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bit-by-bit image, hardware or software devices or combinations of the
two are interposed, which prevent write access to the memory, and
therefore the modification of the original data.
The final result of such a data acquisition procedure must be a perfect
clone of the original memory, and therefore a memory on which the same
identical sequence of the source memory is stored, or an image file (or a
series of fragmented files) that reproduces the exact same sequence of
bits stored on the original memory; in this second case, data compression
algorithms can be applied. The verification of conformity between the
original data and the obtained bit-by-bit copy is performed using hash
functions: if the hash string consisting of bits of the bit-by-bit copy
coincides with the hash string consisting of the original bits, then they
are compliant.
Conservation After the acquisition operations, it is necessary to guar-
antee the correct preservation of the finds. With regard to information
systems, a double regard must be given: it must be considered the
modifiability of the storage media to which the exhibit belongs and
subsequently it must be identified the technology in use on it. On the
basis of all these factors it could be established the best method of
conservation for the considered media.
The ISO/IEC 27037:2012 standard prescribes conservation requirements
such as maintenance of the chain of custody, the use of suitable packaging
that depends on the characteristics of the item to be treated and the
control of the environment in which the find is stored (environmental
threats, humidity, temperature); as regards transport, the standard
requires that the moving parts be secured and that everything is properly
packed.
Chain of custody In the conservation phase the chain of custody is
fundamental, that is the detailed list of what has been done with the
acquired copies, which must be maintained in order to reconstruct the
history of the investigation: who took charge of the supports, where and
when, how they were transported and where they are stored, who has
had access to them and what they have done. The presence of a weak
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link in this chain could nullify the whole work. In some legal systems
the chain of custody is included in the code of criminal procedure.
Analysis The analysis activity consists in recovering those data that
may be useful for the purposes of a forensic investigation, which are
therefore likely to be hidden, voluntarily or not, from the view of a
common user.
ISO/IEC 27042:2015 — Information technology — Security techniques
— Guidelines for the analysis and interpretation of digital evidence was
published in 2015. This standard offers guidance on the process of
analysing and interpreting digital evidence, which is of course just a part
of the forensics process. It lays out a generic framework encapsulating
good practices in this area.
Aside from the standard evidential controls (maintaining the chain
of custody, scrupulous documentation etc.), the standard emphasizes
the integrity of the analytical and interpretational processes such that
different investigators working on the same digital evidence ought to
come up with essentially the same results - or at least any differences
should be traceable to choices they made along the way. Given the
volume, variety and complexity of digital evidence these days, that’s
quite a challenge, hence the drive for standardization, good practices,
common terminology and sound, rational approaches.
The standard touches on issues such as the selection and use of forensic
tools, plus proficiency and competency of the investigators.
This phase will be discussed more in detail in the Section 4.1.
Valuation A further significant aspect concerns the determination of
the circumstances in which a crime is committed and the modalities
of the same; even if the victim can be known, reconstructing details is
essential to shed light on what happened.
It should be clarified that the reason for which an evaluation phase of
the exhibit is necessary lies in the fact that the bit is 0 or 1, hence
absolutely poor information. Since the information can be altered,
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polluted, counterfeited, it is necessary to ascertain whether these events
occurred, if they were potentially verifiable and whoever could have
done these actions. Another aspect concerns the acquisitions operations,
for which it is necessary to assess whether they have been carried out
with rigour and in a correct manner in compliance with the current
legislation. Once these requisites have been assessed, judgements must
therefore be formulated regarding the reliability of the informatics
finding, in the sense of its integrity and verifying possible alterations,
and its authenticity, ascertaining the author or the authors. So, during
the evaluation phase a meaning is given to the data emerged during
the analysis phase and the legitimacy of the operations carried out to
acquire them is ascertained.6 A valid judgement is issued regarding the
reliability, integrity and authenticity of the find, carefully evaluating
every possible event of alteration (who could, how and when).
Presentation The last phase of the forensic examination consists in
the presentation of all the evidence found by the consultant and his
conclusions in a detailed report that will be considered during the trial.
Within the technical report all the documentation acquired or produced
during the analysis must be included. This means is essential to bring
in the "knowledge" of the technical activities carried out during the
investigation phase. The methodology used to analyse the data, the
tools used, the discoveries made must be indicated in an exhaustive way,
providing an explanation of what was done, why, by whom and how
long each operation was performed.
The purpose of the presentation is to transmit to all the parts of the
process the facts ascertained according to scientific techniques and
methodologies, which will illustrate the steps taken. The report will
be more effectively illustrated where there will also be audiovisual
instruments (eg. slides, recordings, etc.), simulations and practical
demonstrations to support deposition.
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3.4 Hardware and software tools for acquisition
Computer Forensics laboratory is a scientific laboratory that must keep
in mind a series of prescriptions defined within the internationally
accepted standards, first of all, ISO/IEC 17025 and ISO/IEC 27037.
The main objective of the laboratory must be to achieve the highest
level of guarantees, legal and technical, on the goodness of the results,
recalling the heavy reflection that such activities commonly have on
people’s lives.
The computer forensics laboratory deals with the identification, acqui-
sition and analysis of digital evidences for legal purposes. Given the
rapid evolution of the discipline, the laboratory should be in contact
with other laboratories in order to set up an investigative network, also
in order to compare the results of the technical investigations on the
basis of the various software and hardware tools adopted. All of this, in
order to determine with ever greater precision the investigative protocols
applicable in most cases, avoiding to leave the imagination, the improvi-
sation, the inexperience and the personal initiative of the technicians,
which last one, however, is strongly used in presence of new situations
to be investigated.42
As said, forensic activities require a method aimed at ensuring that the
data is treated appropriately and that preserves its characteristics and
genuineness throughout the duration of the investigative activity. For the
first technical activities there are open source and free software tools that
allow to approach the digital forensics without particular investments;43
however, often open-source tools are not optimized for specific tasks,
nor are they constantly updated, so it is certainly important - if not
necessary - to use more professional equipment to perform operations
more quickly and effectively.
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3.4.1 Digital storage devices
The tools and software to be used for the acquisition of digital media
are naturally variable depending on the type of support: just think
that only for the acquisition of the two most classic and widespread
media (hard disk and smartphone) both the hardware equipment and the
software are completely different. In general, the essential requirement
in each acquisition station is the write blocker, a solution that can be
implemented in two ways:
1. the tool prevents writing attempts by informing the operating
system of the impossibility to complete the operation;
2. the tool memorizes writing attempts throughout the session, mak-
ing the operating system believe that the writing operations have
actually been completed correctly.
As for hard disk media, solid state disks, optical media, floppy (in var-
ious sizes), USB sticks and tapes, apart from the appropriate cables
and suitable readers, an instrument certainly reliable and free is the dd
command of Linux operating systems; in fact, Linux allows to access
devices in read-only mode, thus not requiring any additional hardware
to prevent write accesses. There are numerous Linux distributions that
collect a set of software specific to the computer forensics (not just for
acquisition, but also for analysis) that are called forensic distributionsviii.
Although not recommended, because it is not verifiable, Microsoft Win-
dows operating system offers the possibility of acquiring IT supports
without the need to use as intermediary a hardware device that blocks
the writing by introducing an appropriate registry entry. In general, to
viiiMost famous distributions are:
DEFT (http://www.deftlinux.net),
CAINE (http://www.caine-live.net),
Kali Linux (http://www.kali.org),
Swift Linux (http://www.swiftlinux.org),
SIFT (http://digital-forensics.sans.org/community/downloads),
ForLEx (http://www.forlex.it),
NetSecL (http://netsecl.com),
Matriux (http://www.matriux.com),
BackBox Linux (http://www.backbox.org).
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Figure 3.4: Example of write blocker made by Tableau
avoid altering - even accidentally - an IT find, it is good practice to use
a write blocker.43 For the actual acquisition are then available several
software that also provide compression (one of the best known is EnCase
but there are others as AccessData FTK).
The write blocker (see Figure 3.4 and 3.5) is a hardware tool that allows
you to read data from the media preventing it from being modified. The
use of this tool is certainly recommended when operating acquisitions
with Windows operating systems that are extremely invasive and can
lead to alteration of data with just the connection of the digital data
storage device.44 As an alternative to the use of personal computers
(and possibly writeblockers) it is possible to use hardware devices built
specifically for the acquisition of computer media. These devices, known
as hardware cloners, allow to acquire in clone or image mode - sometimes
even compressed - and to calculate the hash string.
In generating a forensic copy, it is essential to calculate an imprint which
uniquely distinguishes the digital trace of the forensic analysis in order
to comply with the aforementioned data integrity requirements. This
guarantee seal is created with the hash computing and is a sure reference
to the original trace. An additional technique to be applied to secure
acquisitions over time is the adoption of time-stamp that allows the
operations carried out to be placed over time.
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Figure 3.5: Example of write internal blocker made by Tableau
3.4.2 Mobile devices
As regards mobile devices, ie all devices that can be easily moved and
contained in a pocket such as portable media players, satellite navigators,
mobile phones, smartphones and tablets, the evolution of technology has
led to the creation of tools that have computational capacity comparable
to that of computers: a smartphone today offers better performance
than most of the computer marketed only a decade ago.
Above all, smart-phones and tablets are extremely common devices,
as they have become an integral part of everyday life and contain
information that are often extremely sensitive. From a technical point
of view, these devices are similar to small computers that run their own
operating system, more or less specialized and feature-rich.
Modern devices use complex data structures to store data, such as het-
erogeneous media files, documents, GPS positions and SQLite databases
that contain most of the information related to the applications installed
on devices. This has led digital forensics investigators to focus more and
more their activities on modern smart devices, like smart-phones, and to
Cloud services connected to them. Therefore, it has been necessary to
translate the investigative activities on these new devices, thus making
necessary the adoption of new acquisition and analysis tools. However,
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mobile devices constantly improve the security and protection of the
data they contain, which makes the work of the Mobile Forensics Expert
increasingly difficult and complex.
In general mobile devices keep data:
• in the internal memory;
• in the removable external memory;
• on the SIM card.
For the acquisition and analysis of removable external memory it can be
used the common computer forensics techniques related to acquisition
and analysis of digital data storage devices, while for the SIM card there
are now consolidated methods of acquisition and analysis with tools
such as SIMconix or Paraben SIM Card Seizurex. The activity is more
complex when it is necessary to acquire and analyse the hardware of
the mobile device (without SIM and external memory), which however
provides the greatest amount of results useful for the investigationxi.
The analysis can be conducted in two ways:
1. invasive: physical extraction of the memory chip45 or access as
"root" to the system, exploiting hacking techniques that allow
complete control of the device;
2. non-invasive: data acquisition and reconstruction by connecting
the mobile device to an IT system (see Figure 3.6) which, through
a specialized software, provides for the recovery of relevant data
(possibly deleted) such as SMS, call list, address book, end so on;
in reality, not knowing exactly how these software interfaces with
the device, it would be appropriate to consider also this technique
invasive, with the consequence that in general the acquisition of
mobile devices should be carried out with the guarantees provided
ixhttp://www.simcon.no/
xhttps://www.paraben.com/sim-card-seizure.html
xiMost famous products are:
Cellebrite UFED (http://www.cellebrite.com),
Oxygen Forensics Suite (http://www.oxygen-forensic.com),
Paraben Device Seizure (http://www.paraben.com/device-seizure.html),
MobilEdit (http://www.mobiledit.com).
3.4. Hardware and software tools for acquisition 69
Figure 3.6: Example of a hardware device for the acquisition of media such as
mobile phones, smartphones, tablets and SIM cards (Cellebrite UFED Touch),
see Section 3.4.2
.
for by art. 360 Italian c.p.p. on the subject of non-repeatable
technical assessments.
Depending to the actual considered device and its operating system
version, there are different techniques that can be adopted in order to
acquire a data stored in it, which vary in complexity, effectiveness and
supported devices.
Physical Acquisition mode The physical acquisition mode allows bit-
to-bit copy of all partitions of the entire memory, including unallocated
space. This is certainly the most advanced, effective and valid technique
to adopt in judicial domain. Usually it takes place with the device in
"Download" or "Fastboot" mode for Android systems and in DFU mode
for iOS systems (prior to the iPhone 4S model), for this reason it is also
possible to bypass the device unlock code, if it should be present. The
produced output is a memory dump that can be analysed with classic
Mobile Forensics analysis tools.
File System Acquisition Mode The file system acquisition mode ex-
tracts all the files stored in the device memory, including system data,
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integrated application data and unallocated space within files. How-
ever, it allows the recovery of most of the deleted files and often, from
the point of view of extracted data, the acquisition is equivalent to an
acquisition performed in physical mode.
IOS devices can be acquired in file system mode through the use of
the iTunes backup function, which is able to extract all the contents
of the device (both present and deleted) as files .ipa (iPhone Applica-
tion), multimedia content, chat, e-mail and all other information from
applications.
On Android devices this mode of acquisition is carried out through the
operation of Android backup, which backup all installed applications
including installation files apk and shared memory, whether internal or
external micro SD card. Starting from Android 5.0 Lollipop to adopt
this mode of acquisition root privileges are required, which, of course, is
a limitation, as not always it is possible to grant them. As an alternative,
to circumvent authorization problems and any password protection or
unlock code, this activity could be performed through a custom recovery,
a system boot mode that replaces the default recovery mode and which
contains many more features, including a full backup of all memory
partitions (called NANDroid Backup). The NANDroid backup creates
a copy of the individual system partitions and saves them in a shared
memory or SD card folder. It will then be possible to analyse this
data with one of the programs that will be described in Section 3.4.2.1.
The use of a custom recovery alters the device and it is not always
possible to perform this activity in the judicial field, however during the
backup a log file and all the MD5 hashes are generated to guarantee
data integrity.
Logical Acquisition Mode The logical acquisition mode extracts only
the files present and shared by the operating system from the device. It
does not perform any carving operation on the memory, but can be useful
to demonstrate and certify the presence of some contents received, sent
or stored by the analyzed device, during a legal proceeding. For example,
this mode can be useful (in the event that the other, more complete,
were not supported) for crimes like stalking or child pornography. For
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this mode the same considerations of the file system mode are valid: it
is necessary to have access to the device or to know the unlock code, in
order to authorize the PC to perform the data reading.
3.4.2.1 Acquisition and Analysis tools
Forensic acquisition and analysis techniques are constantly evolving, but
the tools adopted for the extraction of data from mobile devices are
always a step behind the security protection adopted by their operating
systems. In fact it has became increasingly complex for engineers who
attempt to access and correctly interpret the data stored on memory
devices through reverse engineering process. The main difficulty in the
creation and development of efficient and reliable forensic analysis tools
lies in industrial secrets of manufacturers, the presence of proprietary
file systems, new/proprietary operating systems, the lack of knowledge
of the investigators and so on. There are several tools, both hardware
and software, that allow forensic acquisition of mobile devices, those
shown below are the most known and used.
UFED Cellebrite Cellebrite is the leading company in the Mobile
Forensics sector. Its most used tools in the forensic field are UFED
Touch, UFED Touch2 and UFED For PC for the acquisition phase and
UFED Physical Analyzer and UFED Reader for the analysis phase.
These tools support over 20,000 devices and therefore they offer the
most complete solution currently on the market. UFED Touch is a small
computer, running Windows Compact Edition, on which the Cellebrite
acquisition software is executed. On the left side, it hosts USB and
Ethernet ports, to which you can connect the device to be acquired, be
it a smartphone or tablet, but also an SD card reader. On the right side,
instead, there is the destination USB port, to which a mass memory can
be connected. The UFED Touch also has a SIM card reader port on the
front of the device, a wireless card for software updates and a Bluetooth
antenna for acquisitions that require it. There are extensions to the
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kit, such as UFED Camera used to make photographic acquisitions and
brute force unlock of the device, UFED Chinex used to acquire Chinese
clone phones and UFED Memory Card reader, for the acquisition of
SD cards and memory cards, also equipped with the functionality write
block (Write-Block).
Oxygen Forensics Oxygen Forensics was initially designed for commu-
nication between mobile device and PC, then it has been specialized in
reading and acquisition of smartphones and tablets. The suite provides
a complete kit for acquisition and analysis similar to that proposed by
Cellebrite. It contains the Getac F110 tablet PC, the Oxygen Forensics
Extractor software, the USB license dongle, the software to be installed
on a second PC for the analysis and the cable set for the connection of
the devices. As the Cellebrite suite, it allows to acquire a great variety
of models, even if it is limited in some aspects, as well as not allowing
the acquisition of satellite navigators, drones and other more specific
devices.
Magnet Axiom Thanks to its module Magnet Acquire is able to per-
form the acquisition of mobile devices running iOS and Android operating
system. Magnet does not provide any hardware tools for the acquisition,
unlike its rivals, so it supports a limited number of devices. As a suite,
it focuses on Computer Forensics, then on the acquisition and analysis
of traditional memory devices such as hard disks, pendrive, memory
cards, and so on.
Open Source Alternatives Using open source alternatives is a double-
edged sword, because, on the one hand you can save thousands of
euros in commercial licenses of software or hardware devices, but on
the other hand both the acquisition and the analysis phases become
more complicated and cumbersome. Some open source techniques take
advantage of features and functionality provided directly by the man-
ufacturer or integrated into the Operating System, such as Android
Backup mode, iTunes backup, and also DD copy on external SD card
and NANDroid Backup. For Android devices Linux Santoku distribution
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and the Autopsy software are the most valuable tools, while for iOS
it is possible to use the Zdziarski techniques and the iPhone Backup
Analyzer software.
3.4.3 Networks
IT data can reside within IT systems and can be transferred across the
network from one system to another: in this case, the data acquisition
mode is the interception of the electronic traffic generated and received
by the IT systems. The telematic interception can be divided into two
categories:
1. single: monitoring all the traffic of a specific user regardless of the
protocol used and the content of the communications;
2. parametric: traffic monitoring that meets certain requirements,
such as the presence of a certain sequence of bits in the flow;
usually parametric intercepts take place on very large geographical
areas.
From an architectural point of view, an interception system consists of
three parts:46
• capture tool: hardware and software (probe) capable of interfacing
with the network to be monitored and producing a copy of the
selected traffic with predefined filtering rules;
• computer: apparatus (core) responsible for the reconstruction and
processing of communication sessions from which all the informa-
tion requested is extracted;
• visualization and analysis tool: apparatus (viewer) that allows
the use of the information collected and the reproduction of the
contents at the application level of the protocol stack.
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The interception is therefore effectively carried out by the probe which
sets itself the goal of remaining transparent to the intercepted system, not
altering the data and listening in order to passively catch (in technical
jargon "sniffing") everything that is in transit.
The probe memorizes all the communications concerning the computer
system to be monitored, placing itself in a topological area closer to
the system in order to minimize the amount of non-relevant data and
interfacing with the various communication channels used (local LAN or
wireless network, twisted pair telephone, radio links ...): for example, if
the computer system being analysed is connected to a LAN network, the
probe should be connected to the network switch to which the system
is connected, possibly using the span portxii, or positioning the probe
between the system and the switch.
WireSharkxiii is one of the main software (moreover open-source) for
monitoring and analysing network traffic;47 in the field of computer
forensics it is also useful in forensic acquisitions of content available on
the network for which you also need to freeze the entire network traffic
generated in the session of downloading data from the network.
xiiThe span port is a switch port that replicates all traffic exchanged with a prefixed
system
xiiihttp://www.wireshark.org
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4.1 The Analysis of digital evidences
The phases described in Section 3.3 are quite mechanical and repetitive,
requiring only a working methodology. The analysis phase, on the
other hand, requires in-depth knowledge of computer architecture and
operating systems, but also networks, communication protocols, systems
administration and also a certain talent on the part of the examiner
who must find relevant material for investigation purposes. The analysis
phase must be performed on a copy of the find; it must be reproducible
and every single operation performed must always produce the same
result.
The analysis activity consists in recovering those data that may be useful
for the purposes of a forensic investigation, which are therefore likely to
be hidden, voluntarily or not, from the view of a common user: when a
file is deleted it is only hidden to the user as it continues to reside on the
disk. The delete operation does not destroy the entire file but modifies
a bit that discriminates if the file has to be displayed or not by the user:
with this behaviour it is possible to have the operation speed and life
time of the storage medium much higher. The traces of the deleted file
are lost only when that sector is rewritten to store another file and for
this reason when it is necessary to analyse a disk it is necessary to make
a bit-stream copy of the media, which preserves that data would appear
to be non-existent.
Other techniques commonly used to hide data consist in modifying the
file extension to "trick" the operating system and prevent it from opening
the file with the default application or hide data written by encrypting
them in other documents with the technique of steganographyi.
iThe term steganography is composed of the Greek words steganòs (hidden) and
gràfein (writing) and indicates a technique dating back to ancient Greece which
aims to hide the communication between two interlocutors
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The investigator must pay close attention also to the space not visible
to the common user as it is in those areas that often reside the most
useful data for forensic purposes. Some of them are:
• the content or update date of the files;
• data relating to the events of switching on and off the system;
• e-mail: e-mail is one of the most important sources because it
keeps a very high number of information (not only the text, but
also the date, the sender or the recipient ...);
• peer-to-peer files: they are the files shared by file-sharing applica-
tions (fundamental to go back to downloading pirated copies of
software or music or sharing pedo-pornographic material);
• temporary internet files: browsers used for browsing save the files
downloaded from the various sites to a temporary folder and then
actually display them on video; it is also possible to find traces of
the chronology of the last visited sites;
• conversations on Instant Messaging systems;
• temporary application files: some applications during execution
make use of support files to keep track of any backups (for example
a word processor periodically saves the changes that the user makes
on the document) that will then be deleted at the exit of the
application;
• installation files: during the installation process, several temporary
files are copied or generated to determine which software was
installed on the machine and on which date;
• print file: the print jobs are queued and the information saved by
the operating system in a file which will then be deleted when the
process is completed;
• partial files: copying files from one mass storage device to another
may sometimes fail due to user interruption or insufficient space
on the destination drive during a file generation operation; in this
case, the copied data will still be present on the destination device
78 4. A semantic-based methodology for forensic analysis
up to the point where space was available, but will be treated as a
partially overwritten deleted file;
• elements that demonstrate a willingness to delete or hide docu-
ments.
During the investigation phase it may be necessary to analyse possible
damages (or attempts) against a computer connected to the network: in
this case the investigation aims to trace the intrusions in the computer
system (this operation consists in checking the presence of any backdoor
or by analysing log files) to find and analyse any malicious code present
in the machine.
Several events, not only those mentioned above but also others deducible
from physical or forensic elements, can be correlated to reconstruct
the timeline of an individual’s actions. This important activity of
organization and correlation of the retrieved facts takes the name of
"information management".
4.2 Techniques for semantic analysis
This section discusses research related to the realization of solutions
for structuring textual information. In detail, first, a description of
most relevant existing techniques for structuring narrative text is given.
Finally, the motivations for the proposed work are clearly stated and its
research contribution is diffusely discussed.
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4.2.1 Information structuring
Generally speaking, a textual document is the product of a communica-
tive act resulting from a process of collaboration between an author
and a reader; the former uses language signs to codify meanings, the
latter decodes these signs and interprets their meaning by exploiting the
knowledge of:
• infra-textual context, consisting in relationships at a morphological,
syntactic and semantic level;
• extra-textual context and, more in general, the encyclopedic knowl-
edge involving the domain of interest.
This implies that the comprehension of a particular concept within a
text requires information about the properties characterizing it as well
as the ability to identify the set of entities the concept refers to. As a
result, both the subjectivity of domain knowledge and the interpretation
given by the author with respect to final readers make the structuring
of text a thorny task to be performed.
Up to now, there has been extensive research on structuring narrative
text,48 encompassing a wide range of interdisciplinary methodologies
which combine computer science, logic, mathematics, linguistics and
others. In detail, existing solutions rely on different techniques to analyse
texts and automatically extract relevant information.49,50
Many of these techniques utilize linguistic-based approaches, embrac-
ing Natural Language Processing and Computational Linguistics,51 to
gain an understanding of the text, others employ statistical or pattern-
matching based methods52 for analysing specialist or sectorial narrative
texts, leading to the development of specific disciplines, like Corpora
Linguistics, Textual, and Lexical Statistics,53 or for mining information
from texts and supporting document categorization.54
Linguistic-based techniques involve low-level activities, such as tokeniza-
tion, which segments sentences and identifies minimal units of text,
named tokens (e.g. words, word particles, abbreviations, acronyms,
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alphanumeric expressions punctuations, etc.) and normalization, con-
sisting in handling variations of the same lexical expression in order to
obtain a unique representation, by harmonizing spelling and capital-
ization. Moreover, Part-of-Speech (hereafter, POS) tagging identifies
the part of speech of each word within a narrative text and categorized
accordingly as a content word (e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs)
or functional word (e.g. articles, prepositions and conjunctions).51 Fi-
nally, lemmatization identifies the lemma (i.e. a dictionary form) of all
the inflected forms of individual text tokens (i.e. diagnose, diagnosing,
diagnoses, and diagnosed are all forms of diagnose). This leads to the
identification of proper nouns as well as noun and verb phrases rep-
resenting entities, concepts, events, and their relationships contained
within a narrative text.
Standard statistical techniques use mathematical models to determine
whether a word or phrase is a term that characterizes the target domain.
To achieve this goal, they measure unit-hood and term-hood as the
“degree of strength or stability of syntagmatic combinations and colloca-
tions” and “degree that a linguistic unit is related to domain-specific
concepts”, respectively.55 Unit-hood is only relevant to complex terms
(i.e. multi-word terms), while term-hood deals with both simple terms
(i.e. single-word terms) and complex terms. On the one hand, most of
the existing techniques for measuring unit-hood employs conventional
measures such as mutual information56 and log-likelihood,57 and simply
relies on the occurrence and co-occurrence frequencies from local corpora
as source of evidence. Mutual information measures the co-occurrence
frequencies of the constituents of complex terms to assess their depen-
dency, whereas, log-likelihood attempts to quantify how much more likely
the occurrence of one pair of words is than the other.58 On the other
hand, most of the existing approaches for evaluating term-hood makes
use of distributional behaviour of terms in documents and domains, and
some heuristics related to the dependencies between term candidates
or constituents of complex term candidates.58 Common measures for
weighting terms employ frequencies of occurrences of terms in the corpus.
They identify sets of terms or keywords that are collectively used to
represent the content of documents, by assigning a weight for each term,
which measures the importance of a term in a document. There are
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various implementations, but the most common one is the classical Term
Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency (hereafter, TF–IDF) and its
variants.59 Statistical and pattern-matching techniques have been also
used to group documents into clusters or to map individual documents
or parts of them to pre-defined topic categories.60 Algorithm types used
in these methodologies include Bayesian Probability, Neural Networks,
Support Vector Machines, and K-Nearest Neighbors.
Moreover, ontology learning methods, based on natural language pro-
cessing, formal concept analysis and clustering, have been also developed
to address the problem of automatically building conceptual structures
out of large text corpora in an unsupervised process.61 In addition, a
plethora of ontology learning frameworks has been developed in the last
decade, such as OntoLearn,62 OntoLT,63 Terminae64 as well as Text-
ToOnto65 and its successor Text2Onto,66 and integrated with standard
ontology engineering tools. All these frameworks implement various and
different ontology learning methods.
However, the integration of some of these different techniques sufficiently
general to be used in many domains as well as their customization and
instantiation to face the specific application requirements pertaining
the forensic domain still constitute open issues. In particular, the
main necessity is to design a reconfigurable solution able to handle the
heterogeneity of existing forensic images and provide semi-automatic
procedures for defining the peculiar lexicon that better represents the
specific domain of interest.
4.2.2 Semantic approach advantages
Acquisition and analysis are critical phases in digital investigations: the
heterogeneity of support that can store digital evidences, in addition to
the technological evolution and the wide range of investigation scenarios,
doesn’t allow the identification of a unique procedure for digital evidences
acquisition. Forensic tools play a major role in this phase, since they
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Figure 4.1: Digital Investigation phases and related semantic technologies.
adapt acquisition processes to different digital devices (e.g. hard disks,
USB flash drives, mobile devices, IDS Firewall logs, memory, etc.)67–69
The specialized and evidence-oriented design of forensic tools produces
acquired data in different format and representations, that get more
difficult the analysis process and so calls for advanced interoperability
techniques for evidences correlation.
The development of automatic processes that assist detectives in data
acquisition and analysis phases simplifies their work, especially when
dealing with large amount of data. Currently, the most of forensic tools
work on plain text data which does not allow advanced analysis processes.
A semantic approach, eventually based on ontologies, use a unique and
reliable representation of domain concepts, enabling data structuring on
one hand, and standardised representation of data on the other hand.
Unlike structured data formats (i.e. relational databases), ontologies
analysis tools easily make inference of new information, checking knowl-
edge consistency, etc. This because an ontology explicitly represents
relationships between entities.
The methodology proposed in this work improves, through semantic
technologies, all the main phases of a digital investigation, with respect of
evidence discovery, integrity and correlation. It can provide a framework
able to describe, in a more expressive and formalized way, the repre-
sentation of a given scenario. Figure 4.1 shows relationships between
adopted semantic technologies and phases of digital investigation.
Main potential advantages of such an approach regard:
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• Information Integration: the RDF data model simplify integration
of data coming from multiple sources, due to its schema inde-
pendence and standardized representation of knowledge in the
subject-predicate-object form.
• Inference: the RDF/OWL combination can infer class membership
and typing information from ontological definitions; a reasoner
can them in order to infer dynamically class membership of the
instances.
• Extensibility and Flexibility: RDF/OWL provide compatibility
with data model of forensic tools input and output. OWL provides
flexibility by defining custom ontologies according to the scope and
integrating multiple existing ontologies through ontology mapping
processes.
• Search: queries can be enhanced taking advantage of the reasoning
engine and the semantic mark-up used along traditional keywords
during document indexing.
4.3 Methodology for forensics evidences correlation
This section describes the proposed methodology for digital evidence
integration and correlation. The methodology workflow is presented in
Figure 4.2.
Data
collection
Ontological
Representation Reasoning
Rule
Evaluation
Document 
Analysis 
Event Log 
Analysis 
Figure 4.2: Phases of the proposed methodology.
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4.3.1 Data Collection
The first "Data Collection" phase involves all the acquisition operations
and aims at generating inputs for next phases. During this phase the
examiner must respect the chain of custody principles and has to be
compliant with acquisition best practices, depending on analysed media
(hard disks, mobile devices, etc.). During this phase preprocessing
and data reduction may be applied too, using techniques such as KFF
(Known File Filter), in order to reduce the amount of data managed by
next phases.
The complexity (in terms of time and space-memory) of this phase strictly
depends on the kind of device to be examined, on its specification and
on the amount of data stored by it.
4.3.2 Document analysis
Then the data are processed by a Document Analysis phase that extracts
the relevant concepts and the relationships among them. The approach
adopted for structuring documents is essentially aimed at properly locat-
ing and characterizing resources in a text by recreating the domain model
to which that text pertains. In detail, terms convey the fundamental
concepts of a specific knowledge domain: they have their realization
within texts and their relationships constitute the semantic frame of
both the documents and the domain itself. For this reason, the detection
of a series of relevant and peculiar terms in a text allows determining
the set of concepts that can be used to define features characterizing a
resource.
In order to extract relevant terms from a text, the proposed approach
hybridizes linguistic and statistical techniques. In particular, linguistic
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Figure 4.3: The approach proposed for structuring evidences from unstruc-
tured documents.
filters are applied to words in order to extract a set of candidate terms,
whereas a statistical method is used to calculate word occurrences within
a text and, consequently, assign a value measuring the “strength” or
“weight” of a candidate term. Indeed, not all words are equally useful to
describe documents: some words are semantically more relevant than
others, and among these words, there are lexical items weighting more
than others do. The whole approach is outlined in Figure 4.3 and
diffusely described in the next subsections.
Text processing The first stage of the proposed approach aims at
segmenting, extracting and filtering text from unstructured documents
in order to make it partitioned into coherent blocks and enriched with
metadata specifying morphosyntactic information and citation form for
each text element and, thus, suitable for automatic processing. It has
been arranged in the form of a sequence of five basic techniques, namely
Text Segmentation, Tokenization, Normalization, POS Tagging, Lemma-
tization, opportunely adapted to this specialist textual universe.
In detail, Text Segmentation consists in performing a complete global
segmentation of an unstructured document into distinct homogeneous
regions by using features like punctuation marks or white-spaces. Specif-
ically, documents here considered are single columned documents not
including graphics and photographs, and are composed of one or more
blocks, each of which belongs to a coherent section of the document.
One block corresponds to a set of text lines with the same typeface, a
consistent line spacing and ending with known punctuations such as “.”,
“.. .”, “!”, “?”. The algorithm here adopted iteratively examines each
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line of the document in turn, from top to bottom. Lines are merged
into complete blocks according to heuristic rules using their contents,
typography information, or both. Details of the heuristic rules are not
discussed here for the sake of brevity. As an example, in the following,
a heuristic rule defined for segmenting a block is described in terms of
its conditions which have to be simultaneously verified:
Condition 1: The first text line in the block corresponds to either a new
line or a normal text line.
Condition 2: The last text line in the block is neither a new line nor a
centered line.
Condition 3: The last text line in the block is ended by a known
punctuation.
Condition 4: All text lines except for the first and last in the block are
normal text lines.
Successively, Tokenization has been applied to each block, once it is
segmented, and it has been realized by means of special tools, defined to-
kenizers, including glossaries with well-known expressions to be regarded
as forensic domain tokens, and mini-grammars containing heuristic rules
regulating token combinations. The synergic combination of glossaries
and mini-grammars has been motivated by the need of a high level of
accuracy, even in presence of texts with acronyms or abbreviations that
can increase the error rate.70 Tokenization has been further partitioned
into the following sequence of phases: (i) grapheme analysis, to define the
set of alphabetical signs used within a block of a segmented document;
(ii) disambiguation of punctuation marks, aimed at realizing the token
separation; (iii) separation of continuous strings, to recognize strings not
separated by blank spaces; and (iv) identification of separated strings, to
be considered as complex tokens and, therefore, single units of analysis.
Normalization has been automatically performed by first comparing
a block of a segmented document to external lexical lists in order to
recognize and standardize particular expressions (like well-known abbre-
viations and acronyms, toponyms, as well as grammatical phrases and
specific noun phrases) and, successively, setting proper parameters in
order to uniform the different forms (e.g. reduction of capital letters
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into small letters according to some pre-arranged conditions, such as a
capital letter used after a punctuation mark identifies the beginning of
a sentence).
POS Tagging has been realized by using Key-Word In Context (hereafter,
KWIC) Analysis, i.e. a systematic study of the local context where the
various occurrences of a lexical item appear,60 in order to provide a
procedure for word-category disambiguation. In detail, occurrences of
each concept are computed in the text and co-text (i.e. the textual parts
before and after it). The analysis of the co-text allows detecting the
role of the words in the phrase in order to disambiguate their grammar
category. As a result, ambiguous forms are first associated to the set
of possible POS tags, and then disambiguated by adopting the KWIC
analysis: the set of rules defining the possible combinations of sequences
of tags, proper of the language, enables the detection of the correct word
category. After being categorized, words are enriched with additional
morphological specifications, such as inflectional information.
Finally, Lemmatization has been implemented by introducing a parti-
tioning scheme establishing an equivalence class on the list of tagged
terms in order to reduce all the inflected forms to the respective lemma
coinciding with the singular male/female form for nouns, the singular
male form for adjectives and the infinitive form for verbs.
Identification of concepts The second stage is aimed at identifying
relevant concepts for each block of a segmented document and organiz-
ing them in synsets, i.e. lists of terms that are considered semantically
equivalent for the purposes of information retrieval.71 In more detail,
preliminarily, the vocabulary of relevant terms from a block is extracted.
It is worth remembering that some words are semantically more signifi-
cant to describe resources, and among these words, some lexical items
weight more than others do. In the proposed approach, the semantic
relevance is assessed by TF–IDF index,53 computed over the corpus
vocabulary based on term frequency and term distribution within the
corpus. This information enables the selection of relevant terms, by
filtering all terms having an associated index value under an empirically
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established threshold. The set of selected terms constitutes the peculiar
lexicon used to define features in classification tasks.
On the extracted peculiar lexicon, lexicometric analyses are then applied
in order to evaluate the rate of coverage of the extracted terms over
the vocabulary of the input block.70 In the case that the coverage
rate results inadequate, the whole process is reiterated by enlarging the
empirically established thresholds in order to extract terms with lower
associated indices. Once relevant terms are detected, this stage proceeds
to clusterize them in synsets, in order to associate the proper concept
to the list of terms denoting it. In this way, it is possible to refer a
concept independently of the particular term used to denote it. Each
concept, then, is referred by a list of terms representing it, codified in a
synset. The clustering has been performed by integrating two external
resources: the forensic ontology given by “FORE” and a thesaurus of
forensics terms. The adoption of specialized external resources has a
double purpose, i.e. endogenous, since inside the documental base, the
same concepts can be referred by different terms, and exogenous, since
in a natural language query, a given concept can be denoted by using
terms that are different from those occurring in the documental base.
Identification of sections The last stage is in charge of performing a
text categorization aimed at assigning labels to all the blocks of the input
document depending on the presence/absence of concepts in them.72
This categorization has been performed by using features extracted from
each block as inputs to a combination of supervised linear classifiers,
namely Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree and K-Nearest Neighbor.73 For
each block of the document, the feature space is represented by the
set of all the concepts included in the synset and appearing in the
block itself, with the number of their occurrences in it as values. In
other words, the bag-of-words representation is used, since each block
is represented with a vector of the concept counts that appear in it.
In order to make the use of aforementioned classifiers possible, and,
contextually, improve generalization accuracy and avoid “overfitting”, a
feature selection method based on term frequency has been preventively
applied to reduce the high dimensionality of the feature spaces and select
the most representative features. In particular, this method makes use of
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the TF–IDF index, calculated for each concept included in the synset, as
evaluation metric to measure the ability of each concept to differentiate
each section.
Each single classifier has been trained in order to learn the most predic-
tive values for the features belonging to the set of the ones preliminarily
selected and that can characterize a specific section. All the considered
classifiers require only a small amount of labelled trained data as input
and can be successively evaluated, with respect to their effectiveness, in
a testing phase when previously unseen instances of data are considered.
They are easy to construct and update since they require only subject
knowledge and not programming or rule-writing skills.
In detail, the Naïve Bayes Classifier is constructed by using the training
data to estimate the probability of each section among the set of pos-
sible ones given some feature values calculated for a new block. This
probability is calculated by using the Bayes theorem, with the simpli-
fying assumption of conditional independence, since the feature space
contains more elements. In other words, the conditional probability of a
concept given a section is assumed to be independent of the conditional
probabilities of other concepts given that section. This classifier finally
labels a block as the section with the highest probability.
The Decision Tree is constructed by using the C.4.5 algorithm among
the possible learning ones. In particular, this algorithm computes
a tree, where each internal node denotes a test on a feature, each
branch represents an outcome of the test, and leaf nodes represent final
categories, i.e. the sections. Gain ratio is used as splitting criteria, i.e.
to select the set of features which best partition the different blocks into
distinct sections, and, in addition, pruning is enabled to identify and
remove branches reflecting noise or outliers in the training data.
Finally, K-Nearest Neighbors is used to classify a section based on the
majority category amongst its K-Nearest Neighbors. It is based on
learning by analogy, i.e. by comparing a given block with training data
that are similar to it. In particular, closeness is defined in terms of a
distance metric, i.e. the Euclidean distance. This algorithm computes
the distances between a new block and all the previous ones already
classified, sorts these distances in increasing order and selects the k
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blocks with the smallest Euclidean distance values. Finally, it assigns
the new block to the largest section out of k selected ones. The results
produced by these different algorithms are then combined by means of a
voting strategy. It is a very efficient strategy, since previous knowledge
about the results that are being decided as well as a large set of data
to be analysed are not required. In more detail, every vote has a fixed
weight and a fixed probability of occurrence, being independent of the
other types of voting. At the end of this process, the assigned output
category is the one that gets the majority of votes. Its advantage
is that it is almost impossible that more classifiers can produce the
same text categorization result, so almost all errors are reduced. This
text categorization can be successively refined by domain experts, who
can move or reallocate one or more blocks classified as belonging to a
section.
The final output of this stage is a semi-structured document subdivided
into one or more sections. The information about the different sections
produced is coded in RDF for being processed by the framework as
described in the next chapter.
4.3.3 Event log Analysis
Event is a change in the system state, independently from its source or
nature. Some events reflect normal system activity (e.g., a successful user
login), other can occur upon the occurrence of an abnormal behaviour or
system faults (e.g., a disk failure). When a system component encounters
an event, it could emit an event message that describes the event. So, the
system component that emits event messages for event logging, is called
Log client. Event logging is the procedure of storing event messages
in a form that can be analysed. This data can be structured in many
ways for analysis, but the plain text format (the event log, a text file
that is modified by appending event messages) is the most common
implementation, thanks to its minimal dependencies on other system
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processes, and its capability to log all phases of computer operation,
including start-up and shut-down, where system processes might be
unavailable.
To efficiently manage logging information generated by multiple clients,
many organizations adopt Security Information and Event management
(SIEM) software products and services to combine security information
management (SIM) and security event management (SEM). They provide
real-time analysis of security alerts generated by applications and network
hardware. Main features offered by a SIEM system are the follows:
• Data collection: Logs are the main source of data analysed by an
SIEM. Each security system, software, database, present in the
system sends the data contained in the log files to the main server
on which the SIEM resides. Sending data can be managed by
software agent or by allowing SIEM to directly access the device.
The choice on which method to use is related to the devices we
use.
• Parsing and normalization: Each device manages and stores data
in its own way, SIEM provides to standardize the collected data,
cataloguing them by type of device and data type, facilitating their
interpretation.
• Correlation: The correlation between different events is one of
the main functions, allowing to integrate and analyse events from
different sources. Although SIEM has a set of already predefined
correlation rules, it provides the possibility to create customized
rules in order to meet the needs of administrators.
• Reporting: Long-term data archiving combined with the ability to
take advantage of customized queries for data extraction enable
reporting. Reports can be used for audits, compliance or forensic
analysis.
• Dashboard: Dashboards provide an overview of the environment in
real time. Using these tools it is possible to provide a representation
of the data in the form of diagrams or other models, allowing
analysts to quickly identify abnormal activities.
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• Notifications: Notifications and warnings are generated when
certain events occur, informing users of a possible threat. Reports
can be made via dashboard or using third-party services such as
e-mail or text messages.
The methodology make use of Information Extraction and semantic tech-
niques and tools by combining the relevant information extracted from
textual logs into a semantic representation that enrich the correlation
capabilities.
Considering the main features offered by a SIEM system, the methodol-
ogy introduces additional functionalities that can be embedded in a such
system. In particular, the methodology foresee an additional log text
analysis phase, to be execute after the Collection or the Normalization,
in order to annotate event messages with additional metadata. This
processing task aims to automatically extracting structured information
from unstructured and/or semi-structured messages and concerns pro-
cessing human language texts by means of Natural Language Processing
(NLP). In fact, a typical Information Extraction (IE) pipeline can recog-
nize names of people, organizations, locations, dates, references, etc. or
identify domain-specific terms, automatically extending text metadata
to improve search quality.
However, a traditional IE process produces results based on a flat
structure, but according to the Semantic Web principles, information
have to be represented in a hierarchical structure. So, the idea is, from
one hand, to attach the results of NLP process (semantic metadata) to
the log file chunks, and, on the other hand, to point them to concepts
in an ontology. Information can be exported as a text file annotated
with links to the ontology, useful for further ontology population or for
indexing to provide semantic search.
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4.3.4 Ontological Representation
The goal of "Ontological Representation" phase is to transform the
acquired data, by software or even hardware parsing tools, into a set
of triplet constituting the RDF data model. Ontologies used in this
step can be created ad-hoc or even fetched from shared repositories.
Outputs can be stored using different formats, such as RDF/XML or
RDF/OWL.
4.3.5 Reasoning
Ontological representation of data is processed during "Reasoning" phase,
through an OWL-based reasoner that infers additional axioms on the
basis of instances’ relations. The reasoner can infer different types of new
axioms, enriching the asserted instances with information regarding the
definition of their class, properties or subclasses. Moreover, thanks to
subclass hierarchy, property relations or property restrictions, reasoner
can dynamically classify and correlate instances with higher precision
compared to asserted data.
4.3.6 Rule Evaluation
SWRL Rules can assert additional axioms that cannot be inferred
through OWL. SWRL Rules are evaluated, during "Rule Evaluation"
phase, by a rule engine in order to insert newly inferred axioms into the
ontology. This operation is realized with the support of external Rule
Engines that translate inferred axioms into RDF data model to permit
ontology integration.
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4.3.7 Query
By using SPARQL language it is possible to query endpoint hosting
for the sets of triplets constituting asserted and inferred axioms. This
implements the "Query" phase.
A complete discussion about time and space complexities of the
whole methodology is complex since they depend, during each step,
on many, different, elements. During the first stage (collection), as
previously described, we collect all digital evidences from the devices we
are analysing. Hence, the elements that mainly influence time and space
complexities are the number of elements to collect, i.e. the dimensions
of file systems and of logs to analyse. In addition, the whole time for
collection depends on access time too.
The complexity of all the other phases of the methodology depends
on the ontology definition (in terms of how many classes, properties
and relationship are defined in it): the more relationships are in the
ontology, the more is the complexity of each step, because relationships
need cross analysis. However, the number of generated triples depends
also on the actual values of collected evidences, because each evidence
can (or not) contain properties or relationship expected by the ontology
definition.
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5.1 The proposed framework
5.1.1 Document model
In order to manage the different kinds of multimedia data, their relations
and the particular structure imposed by e-Gov applications, the adopted
document model uses three different representation layers, as described
in the following.
Data management layer describes the semantic content of each single
multimedia objects composing the document (such as a text frag-
ment or an image), providing functionalities for managing each
single media; as an example, information extraction and indexing
over text and images are performed in this layer.
Integration layer describes the relations among the heterogeneous mul-
timedia components of the same document or belonging to different
ones, providing functionality for their integration and composition.
For example, the property of a text fragment of referring to a given
image belongs to this layer.
Presentation layer regulates the way by which the information has to
be shown to final users. It provides different representations of
the same informative content, according to the formats, the final
user’s access rights, user preferences and needs and the available
technology and user devices.
This approach allows the management of heterogeneous contents, by
separating the presentation logic from the content management one. In
order to give a concrete example, it permits to give an immutable legal
validity to the content of a document even if the format of representation
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Figure 5.1: General schema of documents processing.
changes, evolving with technology. According to the different description
layers of a document, information is semi-automatically extracted and
tagged with respect to the concepts contained in the available domain
ontologies: associations among concepts and their instances are picked
out. A general schema of documents processing is depicted in Figure
5.1.
More in detail, the tagging process leverages different types of ontologies.
A Domain Ontology is exploited to formalize the concepts of interest
in the reference domain and relationships among them. Some domain
ontologies74 can be further divided into a Structural Ontology that
describes how information is organized within the document and models
the associations between the internal sections of the document and the
set of concepts that can be found in it, and a Lexical Ontology that
contains the terms of the general language and can be used to refer
wide-ranging concepts presented in the documents, not enclosed in the
domain of reference.
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Figure 5.2: Document processing in details.
5.1.2 Processes overview
A general framework is proposed and the related instance for the manage-
ment of the forensic investigation life cycle. As already stated, forensic
images contain text that can be supplied with multimedia information
as pictures, video streaming and audio information. The framework is
composed of several processes: text processing, multimedia data process-
ing, and the integration, retrieval, preservation and presentation tasks
(see Figure 5.2), as described in the following.
The Text Processing process aims at extracting relevant information
from text, associating specific concepts to the related key terms and
defining relationships among them. The text is processed in according
to the following pipeline:74
1. Structural analysis: performs the text segmentation and the related
classification in order to identify the different sections constituting
the structure of the document.
2. Linguistic analysis: performs a morpho-syntactic analysis of the
text (i.e., text tokenization and normalization, Part-of-Speech
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Tagging, lemmatization and complex terms analysis) combined
with statistic analysis, thus enabling the extraction of relevant
terms. These terms and the information about them, refined
with the help of domain experts, will constitute a lexicon that
is exploited for the building of the set of concepts used for the
domain formalization via ontologies.
3. Semantic analysis: by using the information of the early analysis,
it detects properties and associations among terms, defining the
concepts and relationships, allowing ontology building and final
documents annotation.
The Multimedia Data Processing process has the aim of classifying the
other kinds of multimedia objects, associating concepts from the domain
ontology. It is composed of two components implementing innovative
methods that have been presented in:75,76
1. Analyzer : identifies relevant media parts and produces a low-level
description that permits to create some indices to help the tagging
and retrieval tasks.
2. Classifier : uses the indexing information to automatically deduce
which concepts, from the domain ontology, are being associated to
media elements.
Final information are stored as RDF assertions into a Knowledge Base
and all the knowledge associated to a documents is in turn managed
by proper ontology repositories. Different processes (i.e., Knowledge
Integrator, Retrieval, Extractor, Presentation) are finally devoted to
realize the other discussed tasks. It is to note that the multimedia
knowledge is then managed by a Multimedia DataBase Management
System (MMDBMS). It supports different multimedia data types (e.g.
images, text, graphic objects, audio, video, composite multimedia, etc.)
and, in analogy with a traditional DBMS, facilities for the indexing,
storage, retrieval, and control of the multimedia data, providing a
suitable environment for using and managing multimedia database
informationi.
iA MMDBMS meets certain requirements that are usually divided into the following
broad categories: multimedia data modeling, huge capacity storage management,
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5.1.3 Semantic processing
The document semantic processing supported by the designed system
needs a preliminary domain formalization stage that has the aim of
codifying, with proper data structures (ontologies), the information of
interest pertaining to the domain which the documents belong to. On
the top of such structures, the different described tasks for semantic
processing of documents can be activates.
Information extraction and ontology population Once associations
between document segments and ontology fragments have been resolved,
the methodology foresees the population of concepts and relationships
in the ontology by adding the detected instances. Relevant information
are then extracted, document segments are annotated and results are
presented in RDF triples containing the properties identified in the
segments. Concepts and relations are extracted by exploiting an inference
mechanism performed by a Rule-Based System. A generic rule is formed
by a combination of token and syntactical patterns, which codifies
the expert domain knowledge. In order to derive instances of relevant
concepts or relationships, rules exploit Named Entity Recognition (NER),
eventually using subsumption on a TBox-Module for deriving more
specific concepts. The detected instances can be shown by using tools
like KIM77 that highlights the associations among detected instances
and the concept defined in the domain ontology.
Information retrieval Once relevant information related to the domain
of interest has been codified for document corpus, it is possible to execute
a semantic-based search which is able to retrieve information by content
and not only by keywords. The system combines ORDBMS technologies,
NLP techniques, proper domain and structural ontologies and inference
information retrieval capabilities, media integration, composition and presentation,
multimedia query support, multimedia interface and interactivity, multimedia
indexing, high performances and distributed management
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rules in order to retrieve significant concepts related to each document
and to provide semantic querying facilities for users. When a user
submits a query, the system identifies the concepts associated to the
terms used in the query. These concepts are represented by means of
ontologies as synsets, which are the set of linguistic elements linked by a
synonymy relationship, i.e. terms that can be used in the same statement
without modifying its whole meaning. Furthermore, same terms can
be used with different acceptations (the meaning in which a word or
expression is understood). In this case, different synsets are related to
different meanings. If these ambiguities are present, the system will
provide features to discriminate the synset of interest in the search.
Once users have selected the desired synset (all synsets are chosen if no
selection is specified) a query expansion78 mechanism is used in order
to perform queries on corpus where all lemmas in the selected synsets
become lemmatized keywords for a text-based search. The collection of
all the documents retrieved from these searches constitutes the results of
the semantic-based query. A ranking algorithm is used to score results
depending on a similarity measure, based on Tf-Idf index evaluation.
5.2 System Architecture
In order to validate the proposed methodology, a system prototype was
implemented. In this section is presented an implementation of a system
architecture of the proposed methodology, with a brief discussion of the
tools and techniques used. Thanks to its flexibility, methodology can be
implemented in different ways, so system architecture can be updated
among the evolution of semantic technologies.
The overall system consists of an ontology and five modules: Evidences
Manager, Semantic Parser, Inference Engine, SWRL Rule Engine and
a Query and Visualization module. An overview of the architecture
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is presented in Figure 5.3. Its main components are further discussed
below.
Evidence Manager The evidence manager loads binary content of
digital evidences, identifying the type of given source and verifying its
integrity through hash values. This module provides tools to extract
knowledge from a forensic image, like user files, browser history, Windows
registry, etc. The extraction process uses forensics tools like Hachoir
(for binary file manipulation) and Plaso (for timeline creation). The
knowledge extracted consists of a set of attributes, including temporal
information (date, time and timezone), a description of the information
source (source and source type), a description of the event. Many of
these fields are structured and ready to be used as instances attributes;
instead, some of them, like description of the event, are non-structured
fields and they require further processing based on regular expression or
NLP techniques. The output of this module is a file containing all the
footprints retrieved from the disk image.
Semantic Parser Semantic parser module generates an OWL represen-
tation of knowledge extracted from digital evidence in the previous step.
This module instantiate the ontology, combined from public domain
ones, if available, or custom ones. Ad-hoc ontologies can be created to
integrate all the referenced domain ontologies or to define new classes,
additional restrictions, new object properties, etc. Ontology integra-
tion also promotes reuse of entities defined in other ontologies and
increases system flexibility, since domain ontologies may not be easily
modifiable.
Ontology population is made by creating an instance for each footprint
item of acquired data, and by linking them each other according to
formal object properties defined in the ontology schema.
Inference Engine Inference engine performs automated reasoning, ac-
cording to the OWL specifications, coming from domain ontologies or
investigators knowledge. Reasoners can specify the granularity of in-
ferences to be made, such as hierarchy relationship (an individual that
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is a member of a subclass is also a member of the parent class), or
the generation of inverse object properties. Such kind of inferences can
improve the performance of query execution. The goal of this step is
to enrich the knowledge base with new inferred facts, increasing the
examiner’s knowledge on evidence. For example it is possible to infer a
file type from its extension or to deduce the author of an action from
user information in its active account.
SWRL Rule Engine SWRL rules play a major role in the automated
integration and correlation parts of the methodology. SWRL Rule
Engine adopts SWRL rules in order to correlate different individuals
or to establish relationships among individuals belonging to different
ontologies but representing similar concepts. Saving SWRL rules in a
separate text file promotes the decoupling and enables rules reuse. This
module can be called before the reasoning engine make it able to process
the axioms that can only be inferred by the SWRL rules, or you may
execute the reasoning step twice, one before the rule engine and the
other after it.
SPARQL Queries The final module is responsible for accepting
SPARQL queries from the user and evaluating them against a SPARQL
query engine. The set of RDF triples that have been either asserted dur-
ing the semantic parsing of the source data or inferred by the reasoning
or the rule engine are loaded in-memory and SPARQL queries can be
evaluated against it. Once more, the queries can be saved in separate
files promoting reuse and decoupling.
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Figure 5.3: System architecture for proposed methodology.
5.3 System Implementation
A prototype version of a Forensic Evidences Management System has
been implemented, according to the following features:
1. it exploits a unified data model that takes into account content-
based and document-based characteristics;
2. it uses ontological support for managing the semantics of data;
3. it has a multi-layer architecture with different kinds or user inter-
faces;
4. it provides advanced functionalities for document indexing and
semantic retrieval.
Figure 5.4 shows at glance the component architecture of the system.
The Digital Documents (DD) are managed by a dedicated component,
named Digital Document Repository (DDR).
Its objectives are, from one hand, to allow for interoperability among
the different data formats by providing import/export procedures and,
from the other one, to manage security in the data access. Moreover,
documents can be organized in specific folders to easy management and
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Figure 5.4: Architecture’s components
retrieval. According to the introduced data model, it is possible to
associate a digital document to a set of semantic concepts – retrievable
by semi-automatic information extraction procedures and related to
single content units of a document – and a set of keywords – defined
as particular properties of the whole document. In the indexing stage,
digital documents are picked up from DDR by a particular module
called Knowledge Discovery System (KDS). The KDS analyses digital
documents with the goal of obtaining useful knowledge from raw data.
In particular, a Content Unit Extractor has the task of extracting
(by a human-assisted process) content units from a document (and of
generating an instance that can be stored in the system knowledge base),
while the Multimedia Information Processor sub-module infers knowledge
in terms of semantic concepts from the different kinds of multimedia
data79 (e.g. text, audio, video, image). Furthermore, a Topics Detector
sub-module operates on the not-structured view of a document and aims
at detecting using NLP techniques the most relevant topics for the whole
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document. Eventually, the Ontology Binding Resolver sub-module has
the objective of creating – for each discovered concept/topic – a binding
association with a node of the domain ontology. The extracted knowledge
is then stored in the Semantic Knowledge Base (SKB) managed by a
Knowledge Management System (KMS). The KMS performs indexing
operations on the managed information, providing features for the
browsing and the retrieval of the documents. The components of the
SKB (and the related KMS managing modules) are described in the
following.
Dictionary (for each supported language) It contains all the terms of
a given language with the related possible meanings and some
linguistic relationship (e.g. WordNet). Each dictionary is managed
by an apposite management module, called Dictionary Browser.
Lexicon It contains all the terms known by the system: dictionary terms
and named entities (names of people and organizations). The
lexicon is managed by a proper module, called Lexicon Manager.
Term Inverted Index It is the data structure used for indexing terms
inside documents. For each term known by the system (and
contained in the lexicon) a posting list, that contains identifiers
of documents and contents referring to terms with the related
frequency, is created. The inverted index is managed by a Term
Indexing Manager.
Semantic Space It allows the storage of atomic pieces of knowledge
belonging to document content units, which are called document
segments. It is an abstraction of a shared virtual memory space
(with read/write methods) by which applications can exchange
multimedia data. This space is called “semantic” because each
element is associated to a particular structural ontology that allows
for relating segments of the same content unit to content units
of different documents. The Semantic Space Manger provides
functionalities for reading, writing, removing and searching tuples
in the space.
Domain Repository contains the description of application domain con-
cepts and it is managed by a Domain repository Manager.
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Binding Repository contains the associations between document and
domain repository concepts and it is managed by a Binding Repos-
itory Manager.
Media Repository is an Object Relational DBMS able to manage dif-
ferent kinds of multimedia contents. It is managed by a particular
module, called Media Repository Manager able to support classical
multimedia query for the different kinds of multimedia data – e.g.
query by example/feature for images, query by content/keywords
for images and text, and so on.
The semantics associated to the data contained in the knowledge base
is then managed by the Ontology Management System (OMS), that
contains the ontology models used by the system. In particular, three
kinds of ontologies were exploited (managed by an Ontology Manager):
(i) a set of domain ontologies that relate the semantic concepts in a given
domain, (ii) a set of task ontologies that determine the role/meaning of
a content unit in a document and (iii) a set of structural ontologies that
code the relationships between contents and segments. The Ontology
Explorer allows browsing of the concepts in the ontologies, while the
Ontology Query Service is a component devoted to execute queries on
the ontologies. From the user point of view, the features provided by
the system are the indexing of documents and the semantic retrieval of
information. The application interfaces are realized both as web services
and desktop programs (and managed by an Interface Manager). Finally,
two different modules provide security and presentation management.
5.3.1 Log analysis with GATE
Log file documents offer a number of challenges, including a highly
specialised vocabulary as well as common English words used with a
domain specific sense.
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Figure 5.5: GATE annotation editor, showing the annotation sets of a test fil
In order to implement log analysis, the General Architecture for Text
Engineering (GATE) was adopted. GATE is a framework for the de-
velopment and deployment of language processing technology in large
scale. It provides three types of resources: Language Resources (LRs)
which collectively refer to data; Processing Resources (PRs) which are
used to refer to algorithms; and Visualisation Resources (VRs) which
represent visualisation and editing components. GATE can be used to
process documents in different formats including plain text. When a
document is loaded or opened in GATE, a document structure analyser
is called upon which is in charge of creating a GATE document, a LR
which will contain the text of the original document and one or more
sets of annotations, one of which will contain the document mark-ups
(for example HTML). Annotations are generally updated by PRs during
text analysis - but they can also be created during annotation editing
in the GATE GUI, as shown in Figure 5.5. Each annotation belongs to
an annotation set and has a type, a pair of offsets (the span of text one
wants to annotate), and a set of features and values that are used to
encode the information.
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GATE comes with a default information extraction system called ANNIE.
The ANNIE system identifies generic concepts such as person names,
locations, organisation, dates, etc. Therefore it is necessary to develop
new rules, or adapt the existing ones, to target entities of specific domain
applications that are not covered by ANNIE.
Moreover, the GATE architecture provides GATE Mímir, a multi-
paradigm information management index and repository which can
be used to index and search over text, annotations, semantic schemas
(ontologies), and semantic meta-data (instance data). It allows queries
that arbitrarily mix full-text, structural, linguistic and semantic queries
and that can scale to gigabytes of text. Mímir provides a framework
for implementing indexing and search functionality across all these data
types.
Many GATE components can be adapted with little effort to process log
files. The ANNIE Base Gazetteer can be initialized against a domain
ontology in order to annotate many different domain specific concepts.
Also many plugins can be used “as is” to extract information from event
messages. The rest of this section, however, documents the resources
included with GATE which are focused purely on processing log event
messages.
Two main GATE features are relevant to face the problem of indexing
and searching annotation data:
• a finite state transduction language called JAPE (Java Annotation
Patterns Engine) that defines a rich regular expression language
for matching within annotation graphs;
• GATE Developer includes ANNIC (ANNotations In Context), a
visualisation tool.
The two features come together to a degree in that ANNIC allows queries
using a JAPE-like language.
JAPE allows to recognise regular expressions in annotations on text
documents. A JAPE grammar consists of a set of phases, each of which
consists of a set of pattern/action rules. The phases run sequentially and
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constitute a cascade of finite state transducers over annotations. The left-
hand-side (LHS) of the rules consist of an annotation pattern description,
that is a pattern to be matched to the annotated text document. The
right-hand-side (RHS) consists of annotation manipulation statements,
that is what is to be done to the matched text. Annotations matched
on the LHS of a rule may be referred to on the RHS by means of labels
that are attached to pattern elements.
Considering the following JAPE rule entitled ‘EventName’:
Listing 5.1: EventName JAPE rule
Phase: EventRecognition
Input: Lookup
Options: control = appelt debug = true
Rule: EventName
(
{Lookup.majorType == event}
(
{Lookup.majorType == event}
)?
)
:event
-->
:event.EventName = {rule = "EventName "}
it will match text annotated with a ‘Lookup’ annotation with a ‘ma-
jorType’ feature of ‘event’, followed optionally by further text annotated
as a ‘Lookup’ with ‘majorType’ of ‘event’. Once this rule has matched
a sequence of text, the entire sequence is allocated a label by the rule,
and in this case, the label is ‘event’. On the RHS, we refer to this span
of text using the label given in the LHS; ‘event’. We say that this text
is to be given an annotation of type ‘EventName’ and a ‘rule’ feature
set to ‘EventName’.
ANNIC supports complex queries, such as a query that searches for
event annotations followed by past tense verbs followed by device name.
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All matching text ranges then appear in the lower half of the tool, with
a graphical representation of the individual annotations concerned in
the middle part.
For large datasets can be exploited the HPC Cloud computing paradigm,
e.g. the Hadoop framework provides reliable data storage by Hadoop
Distributed File System and MapReduce programming model which
is a parallel processing system for large datasets. Hadoop distributed
file system breaks-up input data and sends chunks of the original data
to several machines in hadoop cluster to hold blocks of data. This
approach helps to process log data in parallel using multiple machines
and computes result efficiently. This approach reduces the response time
as well as the load on to the end system.
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Here, a set of experiments aimed at evaluating the framework’s perfor-
mances are presented. This section aims at demonstrating the capabili-
ties of the approach in the context of a digital investigation examination.
For this purpose, I perform an analysis of effectiveness and efficiency
in a simulated cases. I start by showing how the data related to user
behaviours were collected. Then, I discuss in detail the experimental
setup in terms of execution time scalability, detection accuracy, and
effectiveness.
6.1 Preparing the dataset
For the experimental campaign, it was set up a virtual machine, in which
were stored more than 30,000 files, properly anonymized, coming from
different sources and regarding different topics. Within this dataset, a
set of 6,000 document belonging to specific topics and a set of queries
with relevance judgements have been chosen as training set. The rele-
vance judgements include relevant paragraphs marked within the whole
document.
Further, to guarantee the repeatability of the experiments, it was im-
plemented a batch script in order to perform a set of predefined known
actions on the machine that simulate the user’s behaviour. In this way
the events generated by the script are always the same and the log
analysis performances can be evaluated.
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6.2 Experiments and results
To set up the experimentation, a disk image of the virtual machine
containing the dataset is prepared in order to be fed to the Evidence
Manager Module, that collects all the evidences retrieved from the disk
image. Then, before being used as input of the Semantic Parser Module,
all the evidences were pruned of all known files, such as operating system
files with known hash. This has been done in order to consider only
potentially relevant user files and to reduce the number of files to be
processed by the system.
The objective is to evaluate the system correctness during the Document
Analysis and Event log Analysis in automatically discovering relevant
concepts within a forensic and in particular:
• User Personal Data
• System Events (Logon, Shutdown, Application run, etc.).
• Timeline of Significant Events (e.g., Browser chronology, instant
messaging activities, File creation/editing/deletion, etc.).
6.2.1 Document Analysis Evaluation
Relevant concepts discovery procedures exploit a domain ontology built
from scratch from the dataset, with the help of domain experts. The
comparison between the proposed system semantic indexing output and
the ground truth relies on the well-known recall and precision evaluated
on the test set (24,000 documents). Recall measures the ratio between
the relevant documents retrieved by the system and the total relevant
ones (in the ground truth) with respect to a set given concept, while
Precision measures the ratio between the relevant retrieved documents
and the retrieved ones by the system.
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The proposed method achieves an average recall value of 94.4% in finding
a single concept for recall with respect to an average precision value of
83.7%, a 79.5% recall rate with a 86.8% precision rate in finding ten
different concepts and, finally, an average recall of 74.4% with a precision
of 97.3% in finding 20 concepts.
6.2.2 Log analysis evaluation
In this experiment, we show that we can automatically discover many
abnormal behaviours in a logging system application. To measure ad-hoc
information retrieval effectiveness in the standard way, we used a test
collection consisting of three things:
1. A log file events collection
2. A test suite of information needs, expressible as queries
3. A set of relevance judgements, standardly a binary assessment.
For each event in the test collection is given a binary classification as
either relevant or non-relevant. This decision is referred to as the gold
standard or ground truth judgement of relevance. For this purpose,
we manually labelled each distinct message, not only marking them
as normal or abnormal, but also reporting the type of anomaly. We
classified the events into four main categories (Critical, Error, Warning,
Information) and for each category we further annotated each event
accordingly to the event description. Table 6.1 shows the number of
events of each category for the considered dataset.
Table 6.2 shows the manual labels. Each label group different kind of
event, which can also belong to different event category. In Table 6.2
are reported the number of events for all the categories and the manual
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Category N. of events
Critical 42
Error 7344
Warning 1193
Information 31102
Total 39682
Table 6.1: Number of events for each category of considered dataset.
labels. In the last column is also reported the number of detected events
through the presented methodology.
Figure 6.1 shows that the adopted methodology can detect a large
fraction of relevant events in the test dataset.
In Figure 6.2 we can clearer observe that the detection rate is greater than
85% for those categories containing a considerable number of events. The
methodology does also report some false positives, which are inevitable
in any unsupervised technique, but the rate is never greater than 3% of
each considered category.
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Manual annotation Critical Error Warning Information Total Detected
Application Popup 16 16 15
bowser 8 8 7
BROWSER 13 13 12
BTHUSB 288 144 432 371
Disk 10 28 38 37
EventLog 24 1314 1338 1150
i8042prt 2 2 1
MEIx64 2 134 136 127
Microsoft-Windows-Dhcp-Client 380 380 330
Microsoft-Windows-DHCPv6-Client 250 250 245
Microsoft-Windows-Directory-Services-SAM 72 72 70
Microsoft-Windows-DistributedCOM 6813 6813 6336
Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client 39 39 35
Microsoft-Windows-DriverFrameworks-UserMode 85 85 76
Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog 2 2 1
Microsoft-Windows-FilterManager 4740 4740 4171
Microsoft-Windows-GroupPolicy 23 23 21
Microsoft-Windows-HttpEvent 400 4 404 379
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Boot 1122 1122 987
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General 5960 5960 5900
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP 356 356 302
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Power 42 975 1017 884
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Processor-Power 16 4752 4768 4338
Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs 864 864 838
Microsoft-Windows-Power-Troubleshooter 100 100 96
Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-Detector 56 56 54
Microsoft-Windows-Setup 8 8 7
Microsoft-Windows-SetupPlatform 6 6 5
Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager 2 2 1
Microsoft-Windows-Time-Service 18 262 280 260
Microsoft-Windows-UserModePowerService 565 565 542
Microsoft-Windows-UserPnp 241 241 204
Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient 55 2839 2894 2807
Microsoft-Windows-Wininit 132 132 125
Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon 248 248 210
Microsoft-Windows-WLAN-AutoConfig 4 130 134 123
Microsoft-Windows-WPDClassInstaller 100 100 86
NETwNb64 609 609 609
Schannel 3 3 2
Service Control Manager 39 4485 4524 4524
User32 434 434 381
VBoxNetLwf 286 286 280
Virtual Disk Service 2 2 1
volmgr 88 88 74
Volsnap 91 91 81
Total 42 7344 1193 31102 39681 37105
Table 6.2: Number of events for manually labelled events.
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Figure 6.1: Numbers of detected, false positives and undetected events.
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Figure 6.2: Detection rates and False positive rates for considered dataset.
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6.3 Evaluating effectiveness and execution time
After successfully completing the data collection phase, the ontolog-
ical representation phase and the enhancement (reasoning and rule
evaluation) phase, the investigator starts the analysis by searching all
significant correlations between events. To search for all traces of poten-
tially suspicious executables is possible to execute a SPARQL query to
retrieve all executables. Among the results of the query can be identified
entries with a suspicious name and then can be figured out who interacts
with this malware and in which circumstances.
Table 6.3 provides information on the volumes with the number of entries
extracted by the Evidence Manager, the number of triples generated
during the enhancement phase and finally the number of significant
correlations found. Table 6.4 gives the execution times (in seconds) for
the different phases of the process.
From Figure 6.3 we can see that execution time of each phase is linearly
dependent by the number of entries processed in it. It can be assessed
that the analysis phase is the most time-consuming step that requires
pre-filtering of non-critical information to reduce the amount of data
to analyse. Moreover, we can see that the number of triples does not
increase linearly with the number of the acquired evidences. It depends
on the type of each evidence which can carry more or less information
Table 6.3: Volumes of processed data through the reconstruction and analysis
process
Criterion Dataset No1 Dataset No2 Dataset No3
Extracted entries 6798 4263 15983
Generated triples 8786 10475 32498
Deduced triples 18 21 31
Correlations 1231 535 14982
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Table 6.4: Volumes of processed data through the reconstruction and analysis
process
Steps Dataset No1 Dataset No2 Dataset No3
Collection 1.87 1.43 3.67
Representation 24.37 18.3 167.45
Reasoning 0.29 0.247 0.314
Analysis 776.3 241.3 12314.7
Figure 6.3: Analysis of execution time of each phase of methodology, related
to entries processed.
and therefore require a larger or smaller number of triples to be modelled
in the ontology.
Also, the variance of the results stresses the dependence of the method-
ology on the complexity of the input documents and logs.
6.3.1 How to reproduce the results
STEP 1 Add a database to Stardog (Figure 6.4)
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Figure 6.4
Database full configuration (Figure 6.5)
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Figure 6.5
STEP 2 Add ontology schema to the database (we don’t count these
triples for the generated triple value) (Figure 6.6)
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Figure 6.6
STEP 3 Add user and machine configuration to the database (we count
these triples for the generated triple value)(Figure 6.7)
Figure 6.7
STEP 4 Run the CSV parser to generate RDF representation and the
script to run correlation queries (Figure 6.8 and 6.9)
Figure 6.8
Figure 6.9
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STEP 5 Add generated RDF triples to the database (we count these
triples for the generated triple value)(Figure 6.10)
Figure 6.10
You can notice that instances of File, Access and URL have no correla-
tion.
STEP 6 Run the bat file for the correlations. It adds them into the
knowledge base. . . See the results.txt for correlation triples number
(Figure 6.11)
Figure 6.11
STEP 7 Add the SWRL rule to the database and query it with rea-
soning on (Figure 6.12)
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Figure 6.12
STEP 8 Run the query for deductions. We don’t add the results to
the knowledge base because the results are not certain (Figure 6.13)
Figure 6.13
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6.4 Conclusions
In this work, a reusable methodology based on semantic representa-
tion, integration and correlation of digital evidence is proposed and an
architecture that implements it is presented. The approach is based
on ontologies defining domain of digital incidents and on a set of tools
for extracting information from disk image, populating the ontology,
inferring and analysing new facts. The use of an ontology allows for the
representation of knowledge with a unified model and for simplifying
the building of analysis processes.
Despite the aforementioned advantages, the approach has still some
limitations that will be studied in future works. Performances can be
improved, especially for what the execution time of the analysis phase
concerns. Regarding the extraction phase, additional sources have to be
integrated to reach a deeper analysis of an incident.
In future work, it is planned to improve extraction phase by adding
more information sources related to additional devices, such as mobile
devices (Android or iOS) or IoT devices. From the forensic perspective,
also IoT devices can provide important evidences that could help in the
investigation process. In the main while IoT causes some challenges
for forensics examiner including but not limited to the location of data
and heterogeneous nature of IoT devices such as differences in operating
systems and communication standards.80,81 The proposed methodology
can be feasible also to IoT devices in the measure that information
extracted by them can be represented through RDF format.
For the analysis, can be integrated new tools for event correlation based
on pattern matching algorithm to detect illegal actions by identifying
specific event sequences. Concerning the interface and query layer, it
will be proposed some enhancement regarding a graph visualization tool
that easily show instances correlations.
In conclusion, through the proposed approach a digital forensics examiner
is able to easily extract the knowledge related to a digital incident.
6.4. Conclusions 129
This knowledge can be enriched using a semantic representation that
alleviate heterogeneity problem of forensic tools outputs. The reasoning
process allows to deduce new knowledge from the existing one, improving
analytical skills by allowing easy and fast ways to integrate and correlate
forensic evidences. The use of a SPARQL interface allow to understand
the interactions between facts.
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